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SUMMARY
One of the central problems in the understanding of the child's 
cognitive development is his acquisition and subsequent modification 
of concepts. The present study is concerned with the mathematical 
concept of ratio, and more specifically with the development of the 
child's understanding of fullness as a ratio.
The idea of ratio might be said to involve a quantitative relation 
between two or more features that remains invariant regardless of the 
nature of the component features. Such a quantitative relation is 
typified by the idea of a physical proportion, and it is this which 
will be investigated: with proportion as embodied in the question,
"Which of two containers is fuller (or emptier)?"
"Fullness" is a very interesting concept to investigate, for it 
involves in its very definition a ratio or proportion between the 
volume of a container and the volume of the substance contained. Thus 
in the case of proportion, looked at formally, there is an especially 
great difficulty for the child: in order to make a correct judgment
of fullness or emptiness, the child must resist the temptation to 
follow perceptual appearances, and instead must use a symbolic operation 
somewhat like computing a ratio. He must estimate the volume of the 
container that is filled and then relate this volume to the total volume 
of the container.
This is quite_a difficult task for the child to master, but it 
is plain that in some primitive form the child can deal with 'full' 
and 'empty' long before he understands ratios. The child's first use 
of the terms is limited and he does not grasp what is meant by the 
comparative forms 'fuller' and 'emptier'. However, at some stage the 
child goes beyond this partial and restricted idea to a more complete 
understanding of fullness as a ratio.
- 2 -
At the Harvard Centre for Cognitive Studies, Jerome S. Bruner 
(1964, 1966) has recently been concerned with this very aspect of the 
child's cognitive development. He investigated the concept of fullness 
by requiring subjects aged five, six, seven, nine and eleven to judge 
which of two glasses was fuller and which emptier and presented eleven 
pairs of glasses in all differing with respect to the height of the 
glasses, the diameter of the glasses, the height of the water, the 
volume of the water, the volume of unfilled space in each glass, and 
finally the proportion full and proportion empty. On the basis of his 
results he claims that it is not until age eleven that the child can 
resist perceptual cues and judge fullness correctly.
There were, however, several shortcomings in both Bruner's design 
and his procedure which cast doubt upon these findings. It was therefore 
decided to replicate this experiment modifying and elaborating where 
considered necessary. (Hanlon, 1967)
The results of this experiment showed that the eleven year old 
child, contrary to Bruner's conclusions, did not fully understand the 
concept of ratio through the idea of fullness so the age range studied
was subsequently extended to 15 years (Moore and McWhirter, in press).
However, it soon became clear that even the older children were not 
responding correctly, and it seemed that the concept was causing difficulty 
through misunderstanding rather than inability to perform the necessary 
operations. The children judged according to their interpretation of 
the concept and in so doing gave sporadic glimpses that if the problem 
were communicated to them more precisely they could respond correctly.
A further extension was therefore undertaken in which an attempt 
was made to communicate the problem more exactly to a representative 
sample of children in the same age range and a comparison was also made 
between the performance of adult subjects in the original task and in
the new experiment where aid was given. The original subjects served
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as a control group. The results were considered both within the 
context of the development of the child's understanding of fullness 
as a ratio and also in relation to the findings of Bruner and Kenney.
PART 1
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT AND RELATED LITERATURE
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Webster's Dictionary defines mathematics as the "science 
treating of the exact relations existing between quantities or 
magnitudes and operations". Mathematical concepts thus include those 
of quantity, space and number as a system, and like all conceptual 
development may be investigated in two ways - how concepts are acquired, 
and what concepts are known at different age levels. These are the 
overlapping categories of process and product.
Studies of the understanding and use of mathematical concepts have 
included the following: inventories of the number knowledge of children
at various age levels; experiments on the learning of quantitative 
concepts; longitudinal studies of the mathematical ability of individual 
children; studies of the mathematical vocabulary of children; experiments 
on the teaching of number to very young, or older but mentally deficient, 
children; and studies which attempt by various procedures to accelerate 
the acquisition of mathematical concepts both in adults and in children. 
Although these studies may differ in details of procedures, tests used, 
populations sampled, and the nature of the sampling, the greater number 
of them do have at least one feature in common. They represent an 
attempt to determine the competences of subjects at differing ages in 
the area of mathematics. Furthermore, as Martin (1951) rightly points 
out, most of the studies tend to give "maximal" performance rather than 
"typical" performance. Because the majority of them involve structured 
interviews, their findings may be more forced than those that would 
have been obtained using less structured situations; as indeed, children's 
language in the classroom differs from that in the playground.
According to Goodenough (1930), however, "it seems to be true 
that .... the situations which tend to call forth the maximum display 
of a given form of behaviour for the majority of the subjects may be
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regarded as optimum for securing a reliable series of observations on 
such behaviour”. As long as the present, everyday, typical behaviour 
of children is appreciably reflective of their capacities, any distinction 
between what they can do and what they do do has little meaning. 
Unfortunately, this argument was not supported by Martin's (1951) study 
on quantitative expression in young children. Martin, however, does 
concede^that the absence of any relationship may have been due to the 
inadequacy of the sample of behaviour he chose to study, with respect 
both to content and to the dimension of time involved.
Studies of the type enumerated above do not give directly information 
regarding the developmental process by which children become adept in 
the area of mathematics. Rather they give only the resultants of that 
process as it has operated over a period of time determined by the age 
of the child studied. This does not mean, however, that the data obtained 
from such investigations do not permit inferences to be made concerning 
the developmental process. It is in effect, experiments of this type 
which reveal the nature of the growth of the mathematical concept of 
ratio or proportion and how it may be modified by experience and 
situational factors.
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CHAPTER II 
PROPORTION
A. ARITHMETICAL PROPORTION
The relation between two similar magnitudes in respect of quantity, 
determined by the number of times one contains the other, either integrally 
or fractionally, may be defined as ratio, and the equivalence of two 
ratios is proportionality.
Lunzer and Pumfrey (1966) use the simple example of converting 
a set of measurements from yards to metric units. Any pair of measure­
ments in yards yields a ratio, and this same ratio will appear between 
the corresponding metric measures. By the same token, the ratio of 
the first length in yards and the corresponding measurement in metres 
will also be that between the other pair of corresponding measures.
For we know that if
a/b * c/d then ad = be and a/c * b/d.
Simple conversions of this type are instances of direct 
proportionality and such problems can be solved by the discovery of 
just one ratio: there is no need for the child to think of both
equivalences. For example, if he knows that two inches is equivalent 
to five centimetres then he can easily discover the metric equivalent 
of a foot and the only ratio with which he need be concerned is 5:2 
or 5/2. This ratio can be carried over to twelve inches, and the result 
expresses the equivalence in ratios
2:5 = 12:30
The child is not at all concerned to know that
2:12 = 5:30
Proportional association appears to function very early in the 
child but first of all in an unquantified sense. It is only later that 
the quantified form appears.
Winch (1913), for example, found that seven year old children who
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had never attempted or been given work on proportions, could deal with 
proportion sums unquantitatively especially when only proceeding to 
or from unity, could give correct numerical answers to incomplete proportion 
sums and could be taught to give the numerical solution of complete 
proportion sums by the method of unity.
In a study (Ginsburg H. & Rapoport A., 1967) of children’s estimates 
of proportions of elements similar results were found. Here six and 
eleven year old subjects succeeded in estimating proportions of black and 
white marbles fairly accurately (with a slight tendency to overstimate 
low proportions and underestimate high ones) without using numerical 
operations. The experimenters suggest that early in the sequence the 
children made rough estimates of the relative frequencies in an 
’’intuitive way” (e.g., "there are slightly more white ones than black") 
and then, as new elements were presented, appropriately modified the 
original estimate. The proportions first occurred in an unquantified 
form and then became quantified.
Ginsburg himself (1967) corroborates this evidence and concludes 
on the basis of another study that the young child is a much better 
"intuitive statistician" than one would expect and is, indeed, surprisingly 
adept at dealing with a variety of statistical problems: by the age of
four he is generally accurate at estimating simultaneously presented 
proportions; by the age of six his estimates of successively presented 
proportions are generally accurate and by the age of twelve he can 
derive from a sample of data reasonable inferences ooncerning population 
proportions.
Piaget's (Piaget and Inhelder, 1948, 1951) work on the quantification 
of probabilities reveals a similar pattern. Initially the child is 
unable to apply any systematic or probabilistic strategy to this kind 
of problem. During middle childhood the child begins to quantify the 
probabilities but predicts solely on the basis of the absolute number
of quantities involved; he seems incapable of reasoning in terms of
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the proportions. Piaget believes that proportions involving, as they 
do, relations established between other relations and thus operations 
performed on operations, require a formal-operational structure for 
their mastery. And, indeed, the protocols he cites suggest that few 
of his subjects under ten or eleven years of age can systematically 
solve these quantification of probability problems.
From eleven years onwards the relations between the relevant and 
all possible instances are established for all cases and the child 
understands the probabilities even when the favourable and all possible 
cases both differ. The problem is solved by the calculation of fractions 
or at the beginning of this, the third stage, by successive analyses 
of the different intuitive operations and their logical relations.
"C'est ainsi que .... la loi des grandes nombres suppose l'emploi
A ydes proportions et que les proportions elles - memes, etant des rapports 
de rapports, requirement psychologiquement 1 'intervention du formal .... 
mais surtout, l'achevement des notions probabilistes implique le recours 
aux operations combinatoires (combinaisons, permutations et arrangements)." 
(Piaget and Inhelder 1951, page 172).
Lovell (1968), too, believes that the schema of proportion requires 
formal thought. Using a Piagetian-type approach, he gave subjects aged 
nine to fifteen years twenty tasks involving both proportion and ratio 
or arithmetic series or geometric series that could be solved by 
multiplication or division by a whole number: die! demonstrated that
proportion depends on some central intellective ability which underlies 
performance on all tasks involving proportion but that specific abilities 
also contribute to the ability to use proportionality in particular 
tasks, although tasks involving ratio will depend less on the central- 
intellective ability than those involving proportion. Even at fifteen 
years of age the number of responses at or near the state of formal 
thought in about one third of his tasks was still less than 50 per cent.
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B. PHYSICAL PROPORTION
Apart from this arithmetical sense the notion of a ratio may be 
viewed purely as a relational concept; that is, it depends upon a 
relationship between perceptible features in the world but cannot itself 
be indicated ostensibly. As such, it is typified by physical proportion, 
and has been studied by Piaget and other experimenters interested in 
the development of the concepts of time, movement and velocity, space, 
weight, quantity and volume. Physical proportion has also been investigated 
in such studies as those dealing with the equilibrium balance, the 
hauling of a weight on an inclined plane, the projection of shadows, 
centrifugal force and compensations.
(i) Time, movement and velocity
The concepts of time, movement and velocity are closely related 
both logically and in terms of their psychological development. In 
a series of experiments on these constructs, Piaget (Piaget, 1946) 
investigated children's ability to estimate the velocities of successive 
movements, their skill at conserving uniform velocity and their under­
standing of uniformly accelerated movement. These studies entailed 
the quantification of velocities and velocity differences either by 
establishing simple proportions among times and distances or by actually 
making estimates of the arithmetic value of the distance-over-time ratio 
and revealed that developmental progress continues into early adolescence.
Proportion at this stage becomes extensive rather than intensive 
and mathematical rather than qualitative. It is understandably a late 
acquisition as compared to simple simultaneous comparisons because the 
child must compare not only the part to the whole but also the part 
in comparison to the remainder: "L1operation constitutive de la
proportion n'est pas autre chose que cette relation entre deux parties". 
(Piaget 1946)
(ii) Experiments on Logical Thinking
(a) Equilibrium in the Balance
Although all Piaget’s work has something to do with logic, some 
of his specific studies (Inhelder & Pi&get 1958) in this area pursue 
the question of proportionality. In one study the problem of proportion 
was introduced through the use of a simple balance-type weighing instrument. 
When two unequal weights W and are balanced at unequal distances from 
the axis L and L , the amounts of work WH and WH^ needed to move them 
to heights H and corresponding to these distances are equal. Thus 
there is an inverse proportion:
w/w1 = l 1 /l  = hVh
Finding the law presupposes the construction of the proportion 
W/W^ * L^/L and explaining it requires an understanding of the proportion 
W/W^ = H^/H. Again it is discovered that it is not until ten or eleven 
years of age that the child understands the proportions involved.
Similar results were also found by Lunzer and Pumfrey (1966) for 
children six to fifteen years of age in a study using both the pantograph 
and the balance, but pupils who solved the latter problem using proportional 
reasoning in this study did so quite mechanically: they multiplied and
divided because this procedure gave them the correct solution. Both 
Lovell (1961) and Jackson (1963) agree with this finding and suggest 
that only bright pupils could interpret the situation correctly even 
at the age of fifteen; although against this it should be noted that 
the Lunzer and Pumfrey study was confined to average pupils.
Piaget and Inhelder introduce six logical formulae to express 
symbolically how proportions are actually discovered. They claim that 
before introducing numbers as measurements for weight and distance the
subject usually begins by assuming
p.q = R (p.q) (that is, increasing the weight and reducing
the distance on one of the arms is the same as reducing the weight and
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increasing the distance on the other arm).
This is none other than the proportion ^  = R^ - thus
q q
(p.q) = R(p.q), which then implies ^  ^  = (puq = quq)
and = £— 1 thus ^  (where x = p.q) and
p.q Puq' Rx Nx
leads to the metrical proportion ^ = R ^ which corresponds to
q q
nw _ w:n . 2 x 4  4:2
  = ___  : for example, _____  =____
nl l:n 2 x 8  8:2
Piaget and Inhelder take as their problem the establishment of how
the subjects construct the first two proportions, and explain it in terms 
(ideM&ty) (Cottelafcvue)
of the ^(inversion) R(reciprocity)C^group above. In the first stage 
the child fails to distinguish between his action and the external process
and this is followed by integration of intuitions in the direction of
the compensation of weights. In substage 2a concrete operations are 
performed on the weight and distance but there is no systematic co­
ordination between them; but in substage 2b there follows an inverse
correspondence of the weights and distances. The law is finally discovered
and explained during stage 3; this is true for all Piaget's work on 
proportions and not only in the balance experiments.
(b) Hauling a weight on an inclined plane
In this study there are three variables: the weight the truck
carries, the counterweight suspended by a cable fastened to the wagon 
and the inclination of the track. Here again it is during the third 
stage and especially in the final part of this stage that the subject 
discovers the proportionality of the heights and weights, that is, as 
soon as he considers the height rather than the angle.
The forms of the equilibrium schema (INRC) group and the proportionality 
schema are the same here as in the balance—scale problem. In both cases, 
after the same preoperational representations of stage 1 and the same 
initial operations at substage 2a, the inverse correspondence is discovered 
at substage 2b. The operational schema of equilibrium is established
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only when the INRC group comes into play at the level of formal or 
propositional operations, and in both instances this leads to the schema 
for proportions and compensations in their general form.
(c) The Projection of Shadows
In this study Piaget and his co-workers turn from physical to 
geometric proportion. The proportions involved here denote relationships 
between distances and diameters in a physical phenomenon which can be 
explained in terms of simple projective geometry.
Rings of varying diameter are placed between a light source and 
a screen. The law is extremely simple: the size of their shadows is
directly proportional to the diameters and inversely proportional to 
the distance between them and the light source. The subject is asked 
specifically to find two shadows which cover each other exactly using 
two unequal rings. To do so he need only place the larger one further 
from the light in proportion to its size and there will be compensation 
between distance and diameter.
Once again Piaget's subjects pass through three stages and eventually 
go beyond additive differences to the true multiplicative relationships 
or compensations. In so doing they distinguish and co-ordinate trans­
formations by inversion, which cancel the modification in question, and 
transformations by reciprocity which compensate it without cancelling 
it. Again the subjects learn unconsciously to make effective use of 
the group of four transformations, the INRC group (identity, negation, 
reciprocal, correlative).
Lunzer (1965) has suggested that proportionality is an intrinsically 
higher order method of ordering experience, since it involves matching 
two relations: it is a second-order relation, being a relation between
relations. This is in essence, a modification of Piaget's contention 
above, that proportionality and reciprocity are both expressions of 
the INRC group.
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(d) Centrifugal force and Compensations
In this study two possibilities are open to the subject: he can
construct metrical proportions, or he can isolate the factors that 
determine the equilibrium in terms of the "all other things being equal" 
method. Piaget is here aiming to discover whether, psychologically, 
proportions carry with them the idea of compensation or whether it is 
the other way around.
Three metal balls of different weights are placed on a disc at three 
different distances from its centre. The disc is rotated faster and 
faster until the balls roll off because of centrifugal force. The problem 
is to predict in what order they will leave their initial positions and 
why. Obviously the law of centrifugal force is a complex one, but the 
child need isolate only factors m and r, that is, he need understand 
only that the ball is displaced sooner in direct proportion to its weight 
and later in inverse proportion to the distance from the centre. The 
problem of compensation arises, but the three weights are calculated 
in such a way as to compensate exactly for the three distances.
As usual, the child passes through stage 1 with preoperational 
interpretations (less than seven years), to stage 2a with concrete 
operations and partial correspondences and the beginning of concrete 
compensation. Proportions however necessitate formal thought and it 
is not until stage 3 that there appears the spontaneous isolation of 
variables and compensation by proportionality.
In all cases the structure of proportions requires an element of 
compensation, and the ease with which proportionality can be isolated 
depends on whether direct or inverse proportions are involved and the 
facility with which factors can be compared from the standpoint of their 
units of measurement. The subject in all the above cases begins with 
compensations and works through to proportions, although the former does 
not always imply the latter.
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The compensation schema is more directly accessible than the 
proportionality schema, and for Piaget, this is due to three factors. 
First, compensation is based directly on qualitatively logical relation­
ships whereas proportions acquire an experimentally verifiable structure 
only when they are quantified. Consequently, there is a kind of logical 
anticipation of proportions before they are put into metrical form.
Second, the compensation may be additive or multiplicative as is the 
case for logical but not metrical proportions. This accounts for the 
initial tendency of the child to look for proportionality in the equality 
of additive diffferences. Finally, compensation derives directly from 
the idea of reciprocity which is at the core of reversibility. Moreover, 
reciprocity cannot be combined with inversion except through mediation 
of the INRC group which for the Geneva group of experimenters is the 
basis of all proportions.
In an experiment using Cuisenaire Rods, Lunzer and Pumfrey (1966, 
Pumfrey 1968) at Manchester University also found that below the age of 
fourteen, even in a grammar school, few children spontaneously chose the 
multiplicative method rather than the additive, when reasoning in terms 
of proportionality.
(iii) Space
Proportionality in dealing with spatial problems is much clearer 
than in non-geometric forms. Long before he can think about 'similar1 
figures the child can directly perceive whether figures having different 
dimensions possess similar relationships. Therefore, the origin of the 
idea of proportions must be sought in the actual perception of figures.
So far as this goes, the problem has been narrowed down considerably 
by Gestalt theory, not only by showing the part played in every perception 
by patterns and 'good configuration' but also by demonstrating that one 
criterion of 'good configuration' is precisely the possibility of 
recognizing structures as identical despite variations in absolute size.
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Piaget and Inhelder (1948) explore the development of the child's 
perception of proportions with particular reference to triangles, 
rectangles and open figures. Using two different techniques, asking 
children to describe and draw pairs of similar or dissimilar inscribed 
triangles and requiring them to sort cardboard triangles into groups, 
they permitted the similarities to be recognized either through parallelism 
of the sides or through equality of the angles.
With both methods it proved impossible to carry out useful experiments 
with children younger than four or five years (stage 1). The child 
discovers the parallelism of the sides (method 1) and the equality of 
the angles (method 2) at the very same age (seven and a half years on 
the average), and he learns to ignore the actual lengths of the sides.
With each method the discovery of qualitative similarities appears to 
take place prior to any understanding of the relative proportions of 
the dimensions themselves.
Using the technique of perceptual comparison and pictorial construction 
involving the enlargement of a standard the above results were further 
reinforced for rectangles. The child's judgements progress from a global 
comparison at four to five years, resulting in an over-estimation of 
length, through an intuitive transposition of dimensional relations in 
perceptual comparisons but not in drawings at seven to eight years, to 
the operational generalization of proportions at approximately twelve years.
This correspondence between the spatial and numerical concept of 
proportionality is well known mathematically and it is all the more 
interesting to find that it occurs at the same level of development in 
two contexts - similarities and proportions - which might at first sight
seem to be different.
Proportionality in the case of open figures was examined in a control 
experiment with the enlargement of the open figure by drawings and 
perceptual comparisons. The development here was seen to be comparable
with that found for perceptual and graphic comparison of the rectangle, 
minus the complications due to the child envisaging the global shape, 
and plus others due to the presence of a third distance to be compared 
along with the other two.
In summary then, the formation of mathematical proportions - as 
the equality of two ratios - raises a psychological problem only because 
it does not take place during the concrete-operational stage. The child 
at this level can already construct fractions or numerical ratios and 
from the qualitative standpoint, beginning with the concrete level, we 
see evidence of what Spearman (1923) has called the "eduction of 
correlates" in which the subject formulates the links in a double entry 
table in such a way as to forecast proportions like "Rome is to Italy 
as Paris is to France". This is why Piaget and Inhelder wonder why 
eight to eleven year-olds are not able to discover the equality of two 
ratios which form a proportion and why the discovery is not made before 
the formal level. Their experiments in the most diverse areas demonstrate 
repeatedly that proportions are not acquired before substage 3a. Since 
academic timing is not the caus^ the reason for its late comprehension 
must lie in the actual structure of the operations available to the 
child at different levels.
Why, we may also ask, when a child does try to establish a relation 
between relations, does he prefer to add and subtract rather than multiply 
or divide? Lunzer (1965) suggests that part of the reason may lie in 
the inadequacy of generally practised modes of introducing multiplication 
which fails to show that it is inversely related to division. Pumfrey 
(1968), also at Manchester, confirms the suggestion, from the results 
obtained in a series of experiments using the balance, structural 
arithmetic material and the pantograph, with five to fifteen year-olds, 
that an introduction to the understanding of proportion can profitably 
be made before the secondary stage of education, provided that the
content and structure of the materials used are related to the strategies 
available to the child. In this respect, the findings are in agreement 
with Winch (1913).
(iv) Quantity
For Piaget (1947, 1952, Piaget and Inhelder 1960, Piaget and 
Szeminska 1939), the development of quantity concepts is equivalent to 
the formation of the concept of conservation of quantity and conservation 
involves proportionality. As he says in the opening page of his book 
on number (1952): "Every notion, whether it be scientific or merely
a matter of common sense presupposes a set of principles of conservation, 
either explicit or implicit. Conservation is a necessary condition of 
all rational activity ... This being so, arithmetical thought is no 
exception to this rule. A set or collection is conceivable only if it 
remains unchanged irrespective of changes occurring in the relationship 
between the elements ... A continuous quantity such as a length or a 
volume can be used in reasoning only if it is a permanent whole, 
irrespective of the possible arrangement of its parts. In a word, 
whether it be a matter of continuous or discontinuous quantities, or 
quantitative relations perceived in a sensible universe or of sets and 
numbers conceived by thought, whether it be a matter of the child's 
earliest contacts with number or the most refined axiomatisations of 
any intuitive system, in each and every case the conservation of something 
is postulated as a necessary condition for any mathematical understanding. 
From the psychological point of view the need for conservation appears 
then to be a functional 'a priori' of thought."
The method of inquiry varies with the type of quantity notion 
investigated, matter, weight or volume. The basic technique is a simple 
one. In order to test for conservation of matter and weight, the 
experimenter gives the subject a ball of clay and asks him to make 
another exactly like it, "just as big and just as heavy'. After the
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child has done this, the experimenter returns one of the balls as a 
standard for comparison, and changes the appearance of the other by 
stretching it into a 'sausage', flattening it into a cake, or cutting 
it into several pieces. The experimenter then questions the child as 
to whether the amount of clay or the weight have changed or remained 
invariant as a result of the transformation. A scale balance is used 
to determine the weight, and a glass container with water is used to 
determine the volume. The child is shown that each ball of clay, when 
immersed in the water, causes the water level to rise to the same height.
The experimenter then alters one of the balls and asks if it will still 
make the water rise to the same height.
Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1962) also measures conservation of 
volume with a task involving water poured into different shaped vessels.
The subject is asked to judge whether two quantities of water (lemonade), 
previously judged equal remain equal when transferred to containers of 
different shapes or when the contents of one of these is transferred 
to several smaller containers.
The principal findings of these studies are as follows. First, 
each type of quantity concept (matter, weight and volume) shows about 
the same developmental trend: firstly, perceptual factors all important,
resulting in no conservation; secondly, an empirically founded, "on 
and off" sort of conservation where the child tentatively hypothesizes 
conservation for some transformations but denies it for others; and 
thirdly, a logically certain, almost axiomatic assertion of conservation 
in the case of all transformations for the type of quantity concept in 
question. The other major finding is that, despite this apparent similarity 
among tasks, the conservation of matter, weight and volume are not 
achieved of a piece. For Piaget's subjects, conservation of matter seems 
to become common at eight to ten years of age, of weight at ten to twelve, 
and of volume only at twelve years and after. Of one hundred and eighty
children aged four to ten years, fifty-five showed no conservation of 
any kind, sixty-seven showed conservation of matter alone, thirty-eight 
of matter and weight but not volume, and only twenty of all three.
The increasing difficulty of these tasks for the child is not 
surprising when we consider that weight and volume are each concepts 
which are much more 'abstract' in nature than matter or sheer bulk.
Weight cannot be observed directly and perceptually, it must be inferred. 
Similarly volume must be calculated. Piaget however interprets his 
findings in a more complex and detailed fashion. He conjectures that 
there are certain schemas concerning the physical characteristics of 
objects whose acquisition at least facilitates the formation of the 
quantity conservations. There is first the general capacity to 
'multiply relations', or recognize that changes in one direction may 
be compensated for these occurring in the opposite direction. The 
second schema which Piaget proposes is closely related to the first 
and is called 'atomism'. Conservation becomes more probable if the 
child can conceive of the clay as a whole composed of tiny parts or 
units which simply change their location vis-a-vis one another when the 
whole undergoes a transformation of shape. However, in judging weight, 
the child may yet believe that the weight of each unit varies with the 
location in the whole. Similarly with respect to volume, the child may 
believe that each tiny unit of clay varies in the amount of space it 
occupies, compressing or decompressing, altering its density, as a 
function of its position in space following transformation of the whole.
These are not simply ad-hoc explanations for Piaget. He investigates 
the atomism schema in the following way. Working with one hundred children 
four to twelve years of age, Piaget showed two identical glasses containing 
equal quantities of water, and established their equivalence of weight 
on a scale balance. The experimenter then put two or three pieces of 
sugar in one of the glasses and marked the height to which the water
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rose. The child was then questioned as to what he thought would remain 
invariant as the sugar slowly changed state.
In the first developmental stage, children appear to think that 
the sugar becomes completely annihilated as an existence when it 
dissolves, but at the same time believe that the sugar taste will 
somehow be conserved. Many however, feel that even this will disappear 
within a day or two.
Stage 2 is a complex one, comprising various transitional phases. 
Sugar-as-existent does indeed remain invariant, and still exists as very 
tiny, 'atomistic' particles. However, the tiny grains by their very 
diminutiveness are not endowed with either weight or volume. These 
invariances are achieved later: first weight, then volume.
There are several experiments which deal with the development of 
conceptions of density and compression-decompression. In one, the 
experimenter heats a piece of popcorn until it pops, and in another 
the child is shown several objects of different density. Piaget draws 
two major conclusions from the results of these and other experiments.
These concepts begin by generally being confused and undifferentiated 
and only gradually emerge from this undifferentiated totality as separate, 
stabilized quantity concepts. Thus, in the beginning there really is 
no concept of amount of matter, or weight or volume, distinct and 
separate from each of the others. A little later amount of matter 
differentiates from this conglomerative concept to become a rational 
affair for which conservation can be predicted, for which subquantities 
always sum to the same total quantity, and so forth. However, weight 
and volume are at this point still undifferentiated and, a posteriori, 
are not yet separably rational concepts which can submit to reversible 
operations. Still later, these two also articulate from one another, 
and each in its turn goes on to become a genuinely quantitative construct. 
The popcorn experiment illustrates quite clearly the earlier stages of
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this differentiation process. The younger subjects immediately assume 
that the piece of corn weighs more after it has popped because it is 
"bigger". Weight and volume are, for these children, a kind of global 
"bigness" and are apparently not seen as distinct and different properties 
which can vary independently, although usually correlated in nature.
It is only after the child recognizes the logical independence of these 
properties that any idea of a genuine quantification of either becomes 
possible.
The second major conclusion is more specific: a genuine grasp of
the concept of volume and of its relation to weight requires the develops
ment of a schema of substance density and related concepts concerning
compression and decompression of matter. Piaget's protocols and data
suggest that about the time the child becomes capable of managing volume
problems he also conceives of matter as composed of numerous tiny parts
or elements with empty spaces in between. Substances can vary as to
how tightly these elements are compressed. Objects which are heavy for
their size are thus composed of tightly packed elements; lighter ones
are more loosely packed, with lots of spaces. A further study, reported
in the book on geometry, (Piaget, Inhelder and Szeminska, I960) deals
more specifically with the conservation and measurement of volume. The
child is shown a block which is quite solid and is told that the block
is an old house built on a little island. It seems that this house is
threatened, and so the inhabitants decide to build another in its place.
The new house is to have exactly as much room as the old, although it
is being built on another island, which differs from the first in size
or shape or in both. The problem consists in reproducing the volume
of the first block while altering its form to comply with the base
which is given. Furthermore, the equal volume must be built out of
3
little wooden cubes each of which is 1 cm. , while the original is a 
solid block. Conservation of volume was tested in two ways. In one
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form of the test the thirty-six cubes were arranged to make different 
"houses" and the child was asked if they had the same or different amount 
of "room" in them. The other form was the displacement-of-water one 
used in the original conservation of volume study.
For the measurement part of the study, the developmental sequence 
was roughly as follows. The youngest children compare houses on a 
single dimension only, frequently the height, and if asked to copy the 
original house directly, they tend to do so by enclosing it with unit 
blocks, rather than by making a replica alongside the model. At the 
next stage, the child begins to bring logical multiplication to bear 
on the problem. That is, he knows that a smaller base necessitates a 
higher structure but how much higher it should be he has no procedure 
for determining. Eventually, in middle childhood and early adolescence, 
the child manages to solve the problem by arithmetically multiplying 
dimensions.
This study on the conservation of volume uncovered one interesting 
new fact about its development. There appears to be a stage in middle 
childhood (average age around nine years) when, in Piaget's phraseology 
the child conserves "interior volume" but does not yet conserve "occupied 
volume". He recognizes that the number of cubes always remains the same 
and therefore asserts that the amount of room made is also the same from 
house to house. However, he paradoxically refuses to conclude from this 
that when finding the volume of the house by displacement the water level 
in the bowl will also stay the same whatever the arrangement of the 
submerged cubes comprising the house. In Piaget's interpretation, the 
child of this stage does have a beginning conception of volume; however, 
the volume he conceives of pertains to the object alone, with no 
implication for the volume of its surrounding medium.
Lunzer (1960 b) repeated this experiment and concludes that there 
is little reason to doubt that Piaget's main lines of development are
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correct in broad outline. However, he found no.evidence that conservation 
of volume should be regarded as limited by the priority of topological 
over Euclidean conceptions of geometry.
Piaget's work in this field has been replicated in a series of 
experiments by Elkind (1961 a,b,c, 1962, Flavell 1966) on subjects of 
different ages. He found that the age 'decalage' between the conservation 
of matter, weight and volume, may be considerably greater than Piaget 
had thought. About 75% of Elkind's subjects had acquired conservation 
of matter and weight around the seven to nine year period, but the 75% 
level for conservation of volume does not seem to occur until about age 
fifteen.
Evidence in broad support of Piaget is found in the work of Lovell 
and Ogilvie (1960, 1961) on testing junior school children (age seven to 
ten years) for conservation of global quantity and interior volume, and 
complementary or displaced volume. These experimenters offer the 
hypothesis - very much in accord with Piaget's views on the task-and-area- 
specific nature of concrete as opposed to formal-operational thought - 
that the child can at first apply a concept of conservation of global 
quantity only in particular, selected situations; with additional 
maturation and experience, the concept becomes a stable and consistent 
instrument of cognition, applicable to a broad range of concrete instances.
A further replication study involving cross-cultural comparisons 
was carried out by Hyde (1959). Aden subjects were given several 
quantity tasks in addition to the number ones and unlike Elkind, this 
experimenter found no strong evidence for the global quantity-weight- 
volume 'decalage1. Careful scrutiny of these studies does not suggest 
any immediate explanation for the discrepancy in results but data from 
the Hyde study regarding the conservation task in which sugar is 
dissolved in water largely confirmed Piaget's qualitative observations. 
There is also some tentative information regarding the difficulty level
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of the various quantity tasks. For example, conservation of global 
quantity in the plasticine-balls task appears to be more difficult to 
achieve than in the water-in-vessels setting, but easier than in the 
sugar-in-water test.
In yet another study Piaget's conclusions with young children were 
again confirmed but it was found that the subjects may be influence by the 
form in which the problem is presented (Carpenter, 1955). Lunzer (1956, 
1960a, 1965), however, extended the typical situation and asked his 
subjects aged six to twelve years to pour the same amount of liquid into 
two different shaped containers. The child had at his disposal one pint 
bottle filled with water, one baby's feeding bottle graduated in fluid 
ounces and incccs., and one funnel. It was to be expected that there 
will be some gap between the appreciation of the constancy of a liquid 
through changes in its shape, as measured in the original experiment of 
Piaget, and the insightful planned application of that knowledge required 
in this experiment. This was in fact found to be the case, and Lunzer 
tentatively concludes that: "The absence of the notion of the constancy
of a liquid in a subject does not necessarily imply complete failure to 
co-ordinate the two dimensions involved but that, the co-ordination is 
not quantitatively adequate."
Fran^oise Frank (reported in Bruner 1964, 1966) did -^ cfsfcly classic 
conservation tests to determine which children (of a group aged four to 
seven) exhibited conservation and which did not. She then went bn to 
other procedures among which was the following. Two standard beakers 
are partly filled so that the child judges them to contain equal amounts 
of water. A wider beaker of the same height is introduced and the three 
beakers are now, except for their tops, hidden by a screen. The 
experimenter pours from a standard beaker into the wider beaker. The 
child, without seeing the water, is asked which has more to drink, or 
do they have the same amount. In comparison with an unscreened pretest
there is a striking increase in correct equality judgements. With the 
screen present, most children justify their correct judgement by noting 
that "It's the same water" or "You only poured it".
Now the screen is removed. All the four year-olds change their 
minds. The perceptual display overwhelms them and they decide that the 
wider beaker has less water. Virtually all the five year-olds stick to 
their judgement, after invoking the difference between appearance and 
reality. All of the six and seven year-olds retain correct judgement.
Some minutes later, Frank then does a post-test on the children using a 
tall thin beaker along with the standard ones, and no screen. The four 
year-olds are unaffected by their prior experience; none of them is able 
to grasp the idea of invariant quantity in the new task. The older 
children show marked improvement in performance. Finally, control groups 
doing just a pretest and a post-test show no significant learning.
A related experiment by Patricia Nair (reported in Bruner, 1964) in 
1963 explores the arguments children use when they solve a conservation 
task correctly and when they do not. Her forty subjects were all five 
year-olds. She transferred water from one rectangular clear plastic 
tank to another that was both longer and wider than the first. She had 
a toy duck swimming in the first container, and when the water was poured 
into the new container she told the child that "The duck was taking his 
water with him".
Three kinds of arguments were set forth by the children to support 
their judgements. One is perceptual- having to do with the height, width, 
or apparent "bigness" of the water. A second type has to do with action: 
The duck took the water along, or the water was only poured. A third 
one, "transformational" argument, invokes the reversibility principle: 
if you poured the water back into the first container, it would look the 
same again. (Not one of the children in this experiment used the 
compensation argument - that though the water was lower it was
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correspondingly wider and was, therefore, the same amount of water, 
although this type of reasoning by compensation is said by Piaget and 
Inhelder (1962) to be the basis of conservation).
Bruner does not report how many children judged correctly, but of 
those who thought the water was not equal in amount after pouring, 
fifteen per cent used non-perceptual arguments to justify their judgement. 
Of those who recognized the equality of the water, two-thirds used non- 
perceptual arguments. It is plain that if a child is to succeed in the 
conservation task, he must have some internalized formula that shields 
him from the overpowering appearance of the visual displays much as in 
in the Frank experiment. The explanations of the children who lacked 
conservation suggest how strongly oriented they were to the visual 
appearance of the displays they had to deal with. Thus it may be concluded 
from all these studies that the conservation of volume is not worked out 
conceptually before the beginnings of the final level at eleven to twelve 
years. Applied to quantity conceptions, Piaget's theory holds that the 
child is ready for attaining the abstract volume conception at ages of 
eleven to twelve; he is ready in the maturational sense because the 
conceptualization of volume requires only concrete operations 
(internalized actions) which are present in most children by age of seven 
(Elkind 1961 b,c, Piaget 1952, Piaget and Inhelder 1962) and he is also 
ready in the experiential sense that he has had sufficient object contacts 
to form abstract conceptions of mass and weight which are the structural 
prerequisites for the attainment of the volume conception (Piaget 1954, 
Smedslund 1961a).
The relatively late acquisition of the volume concept may be due to 
several factors: in part, one would guess that only very few could arrive
by themselves at a valid method of calculating volume in the absence of 
geometrical teaching which takes place at twelve or thirteen. On the 
other hand, that equal volumes must displace equal quantities of water
if totally immersed, or that water poured from one container to another 
must remain invariant, seem to be ideas which children might arrive at 
spontaneously. But the attainment of such an idea must involve: (i) an
implicit recognition of the equivalence of volume in the two solids;
(ii) an implicit recognition of the conservation of volume in the liquid 
itself - despite its physical displacements and transformation; and
(iii) an appreciation of the relationship between the volume of the body 
immersed in a liquid and the volume of liquid displaced. Hence, one 
cannot be surprised to find that this understanding is considerably 
delayed.
Furthermore, in contrast to the simple forms of conservation which 
the child masters by simple additive compensations, the conservation of 
volume throughout changes of form presupposes the ability to handle 
complex proportions (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958).
In the first stage of attainment of the conservation of volume, 
the child compares the volumes only in a perceptual way, and cannot 
employ "la partition en unites egales ou la decomposition en dimensions 
proportioned" (Piaget and Szeminska, 1939). The child fails to understand 
that the increased height is compensated by the decreased width and that 
the two values are inversely proportional.
In the second stage of intermediate responses, the child is 
beginning to establish proportionality "proprement dite" and not merely 
qualitative correlation.
In the third and final stage, conservation is so widespread that it 
seems an 'a priori' and analytic deduction independent of otygervation of 
relationships and experience, but it is not so; it is a co-ordination 
of relations, including both logical multiplication of relationships 
and of the mathematical composition of parts and of proportions. Piaget 
concludes that "ce n'est pas la decouverte de la conservation qui 
entrd!ine la possibilite^de multiplier les relations, mais bien l'inverse ...
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Nous pretendons - et c'est la toute notre hypothese - qu'a un moment 
donne le sujet comprend que les differences se compensent .... et c ’est 
ainsi, que debute la quantification extensive, parce qu'alors deux 
rapports qualitatifs heterogenes .... sont conjues comme egaux tout en 
conservant leur signification de difference asymetrique. Ainsi na*t 
done la proportion, par combinaison de l ’egalite avec la relation 
asymetrique.” (Piaget and Szeminska 1939, page 62).
It is noteworthy that the child does not come to control the notions 
of multiplicative compensations and conservation of volume until the age 
when he discovers proportions in other areas. However, he does make the 
discovery without metrical calculation and without realizing that the 
numerical calculation of the compensations that he conceptualizes 
qualitatively implies the use of proportions. The indication is (Piaget 
and Inhelder, 1962) that when an operational schema is organized the 
subject discovers its various consequences simultaneously, even without 
bringing together the various aspects of the schema, and this applies 
equally to multiplicative compensations and proportions.
This idea of proportion or ratio as embedded in the task of judging 
volume is examined in the experiment by Halford (1968) where six to eight 
year old children in conservation and non-conservation groups were tested 
for their ability to predict whether the contents of comparison containers 
differing in height and diameter of glass were equal or unequal to that 
of the original container. For the experimental subjects, a standard 
container equal to the comparisons in height or breadth, but differing 
from the original in both, was filled from the original in the subject’s 
view. The results, show that the conserving subjects were superior in 
recognizing equality and unequality even without the use of the standard 
and made superior use of the knowledge that the standard and original, 
though of different dimensions, contained the same quantity.
The proportion notion is pursued further in the study carried out
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at the Harvard Centre for Cognitive Studies by Bruner and Kenney 
(1964, 1966). The above studies on conservation of volume by Piaget, 
his co-workers, and also by other experimenters validating Piaget's 
results, were concerned only with changes in water level as liquid 
was poured from one container to another of different dimensions; 
they did not involve directly the concept of fullness.
Bruner and Kenney, however, went beyond the concept of volume 
itself and asked their subjects to judge which of two containers was 
fuller and which was emptier. Volume in the earlier studies was clearly 
visible to the child; the physical proportion or ratio involved in 
this study is not. It depends upon a relationship between the perceptible 
features of the containers, but the relationship itself cannot be defined 
ostensively. Rather, it requires the child to carry out a symbolic 
operation somewhat like computing a ratio.
The basic problem posed for the children is, on the surface, a 
simple one: which of two vessels in a pair is fuller and then which
one is emptier. The experiment itself consisted of paired comparisons 
of glasses, filled to varying degrees with ordinary water. In all, 
one hundred and sixty children served as subjects, forty in each of the 
age groups five, six and seven, and twenty each in the age groups 
nine and eleven. Originally the study (Bruner 1964) encompassed only 
the three younger age groups, but when it became quite clear that by 
age five, a definite idea of "proportion", albeit an incorrect one, 
is already present and that by age seven the children still had not 
grasped the idea in its proper mathematical sense, the two older groups 
were included in the study.
Bruner presented his subjects with eleven pairs of glasses in 
fixed order (see Figure 1). The task begins with a very easy judgement 
involving two identical glasses filled to the same proportion. From 
there on it becomes more complicated by virtue of there being pairs
Figure 1
The eleven displays of glasses used in the 
experiment on fullness by Bruner and Kenney (1964, 1966)
Scale £ inch to 1 inch
Display 1 
Type IV
Display 2 
Type II
Display 3 
Type III
Display 4 
Type I
Display 5 
Type IV
Display 6 
Type II
Display 7 
Type II
Display 8 
Type III
Display 9 
Type III
Display 10 
Type I
Display 11 
Type I
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that are made up of glasses of unequal volume and pairs that are equally 
or unequally full. Any two pairs of glasses can differ or be the same 
in the following respects:
the proportion they are filled
the proportion they are empty
their water levels
the height of the glasses
the diameter of the glasses
the volume of water they contain
the volume of empty space they contain.
Aside from the first two of these measures, which bear a complementary 
relation to each other, Bruner states that all the other measures are 
independently variable of each other as well as independent of the first 
two indices. This is not exactly true, since the first two ratio measures 
and also the last two volume measures depend entirely on the water levels, 
the height of the glasses and also the diameter of the glasses. It is
only these latter three measures which can vary independently. However,
Bruner used this feature of independent variability in constructing the 
displays, selecting among all combinations of features.
His display pairs were of four types. In type I (Displays 4, 10 
and 11), glasses of unequal volume are partly filled but to an equal 
proportion. Type II displays (numbers 2, 6 and 7 are the examples) have 
unequal volume but both glasses in the pair are filled to the top.
Type III displays (numbers 3, 8 and 9) again contain pairs of unequal 
volume in which one glass is fractionally full, the other completely full. 
Finally, type IV consists of a pair of identical glasses in which the 
only factor that differs is water level (display 5).
In the above pairs the perceptual features can be arranged in such
a way as to throw the perceptual factors either for or against a correct
ratio judgement. Pair 11, for example, is one in which everything
perceptual goes against a judgement of equally full: one of the glasses
is taller, has a higher water level, is wider and has, therefore, also 
a greater volume of water than the other.
Bruner and Kenney attempted "linguistic activation" with the three 
youngest age groups, in order to test whether alerting the children to 
the specific perceptual properties of the displays would alter their 
judgements of proportion. No significant improvement was found, and 
the experimenters concluded that it "avails little to activate children 
to separate cues when their difficulty is not so much with the cues as 
such but with their combination".
Although they do not give percentages of subjects correct in each 
age group, the experimenters do consider the bases for judgements of 
fuller and emptier. It was found that the younger children equate 
"fuller" with the glass having the larger volume of water, and "emptier" 
with the smaller volume. For the seven and nine year-olds, on the other 
hand, "empty" means more volume of empty space, and it is only the nines 
and the elevens who attempt or successfully succeed in formulating the 
ratio idea in terms of a relation between quantities.
Because the older children have developed some appreciation of a 
complementary relation of filled and empty space, they are led into 
logical contradiction; for indeed, with this rule they may say, given 
a large glass and a small glass, both half full, the glass that is fuller 
is also emptier. The younger children with their more global approach 
are no more correct but are not led into any contradiction.
In analysing for the effect of perceptual factors on the child's 
judgement of fullness, Bruner and Kenney subdivide the displays into 
those in which all cues (namely, water level, volume of water, and 
"reaching to the top") favour the correct judgement (1 and 5), those 
where most do (6 and 8), those where they are balanced (2 and 10)$ those 
where most cues mislead (3, 7 and 9), and those where all mislead
(presumably 4 and 11). They hypothesized that the numher of correct 
judgements would conform to this order, and such turned out to be the 
case. Furthermore, the older the child the less perceptual factors 
dominated judgement in this way.
Finally, Bruner and Kenney analysed the number of children who named 
several perceptible attributes as a basis for their judgements. It was 
found that older children tend to be somewhat more pluralistic about the 
criteria they use than the younger subjects, who refer to some single 
attribute. At eleven, they are able to co-ordinate the crucial relation­
ships and state these economically as well as being able to consider more 
attributes. The proportion of children giving multiple bases for their 
judgements of fullness quintuples between age five and age nine, and 
triples for their judgements of emptiness. "The eleven year-old," however, 
"knowing the answer, need not give multiple reasons. He merely remarks 
on the common fraction". The eleven year-old child has ordered his 
perceptual world so that he is able to apply concepts of relationship 
that are not dependent upon simple ostensive definition. In short, 
according to Bruner and Kenney, he has acquired the concept of ratio 
or proportion through the idea of fullness.
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CHAPTER III
FACTORS INVOLVED IN PERFORMANCE IN CONCEPT FORMATION EXPERIMENTS
Piaget lays great stress on the spontaneous development of cognitive 
abilities as the child matures and maintains that experimental factors 
can become effective only to the extent that they build on the child’s 
previously developed structures of thought, as through the activation 
of the reasoning process prior, but logically related, to the one to 
be developed.
Maturation is undoubtedly of great importance but, on the other 
hand, there are other factors which are influential in the child’s 
performance in concept formation experiments and in his acquisition 
of concepts like proportion: these include language, instructions,
relevant and irrelevant information, feedback and reinforcement, perceptual 
and practical experience and training.
(i) Language
Since the successful performance on Piagetian-type tasks appears 
to be influenced by the ease of communication between the experimenter 
and the subject, one might reasonably expect children who attend school 
to understand and use language more effectively than those who have been 
deprived of schooling and thus perform at a higher level on conservation 
tasks involving verbal communication. Yet, ask Mermelstein and Shulman
(1967), "do we in this manner confound the attainment of a particular 
cognitive structure with the ability to manifest it in verbal communication?"
As Piaget maintains that perceptions precede language developmentally, 
we might expect that children’s performances on non-verbal tasks will be 
categorised at a higher developmental level than their performances on 
tasks measuring ostensibly the same cognitive structure but requiring 
verbal communication. Also, we might expect greater differences between 
schooled and unschooled children on verbal tasks.
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Utilizing a nonverbal measure of conservation of quantity as well 
as the standard verbal tasks, Mermelstein and Shulman compared performances 
of six and nine year old Negro children from two different communities, 
one of which had been without public schools for four years, on five 
tasks involving the conservation of continuous quantities (one nonverbal 
and two verbal tasks), and the conservation of discontinuous quantities 
and its relation to one-to-one correspondence (two verbal tasks). 
Differences between verbal and nonverbal tasks were found to be highly 
significant, and no significant differences were found generally that 
were attributable to the effects of non-schooling except within one 
questioning condition, where the perception of the conservation of the 
discontinuous substances were connected with the needs of the subjects.
Although opposed to Dodwell’s (1960, 1961) suggestion that socio­
economic status and length of schooling do make a differenceaarid 
Rothenberg's (1969) finding that lower-class children are more likely 
to be inaccurately assessed in terms of conservation status than middle- 
class children due to their poorer verbal ability especially as many 
studies require justification of performance by subjects, this finding 
is in accord with Price-Williams1 (1962) results for African Bush 
children and Goodnow and Bethon's (1966) study in Hong Kong where again 
no difference in performance on conservation-type tasks between children 
who had had formal schooling and those who had not was found.
Mermelstein and Shulman suggest that the syncretic nature of 
egocentric thought may help to explain these results: if six and nine
year old children emphasize the events implied by the questions rather 
than the relationships of the questions to the events, this may account 
for the similarity in performances of the non-schooled and schooled nine 
year olds. It is also conceivable, they state, that specific training 
in language does not ensure analytic understanding of the questions 
used prior to nine years of age.
There is also evidence in this study that the absence or presence 
of language itself significantly affects performance, since there was 
a lower mean age of acquisition for the nonverbal continuous task than 
the verbal discontinuous task. Variations in question phrasing appeared 
here to influence significantly performance on certain number tasks and 
the; hypothesis of no difference in performance is supported for the 
continuous but not the discontinuous tasks. These factors throw doubt 
both on Piaget's results, which do not take into account the language 
variable, and on his techniques of assessment.
Recent studies have measured conservation attainment through 
standard question formats because they provide a more comparable situation 
for all Ss than does Piaget's more flexible, clinical method of questioning 
Within the limits of standard formats the major difficulties are in the 
vocabulary level and structure of the questions. Some investiators 
(Shantz and Sigel in Rothenberg 1969; Wallace, 1966) have indicated 
that with the most common standard questions a major problem arises in 
the interpretation of the Ss' responses: among the Ss who fail to conserve
it has not been possible to know whether this failure was due to inability 
to understand the language of the question, the concept of conservation, 
or both. Recent studies (Donaldson and Balfour, 1968^ Griffiths, Shantz 
and Sigel, 1967, Pratoomraj and Johnston, 1966) have dealt with the first 
aspect of the measurement problem, the language level. These studies 
have pointed to the importance of assessing the S's comprehension of 
the key worcls (i.e., "same", "more") used in the conservation questions 
or training the S to criterion in his understanding of these words prior 
to testing his level of conservation attainment. Pratoomraj and Johnston 
(1966), for example, found with children aged four to seven years that 
the kind of question they used ('Is it the same? more? less? different?") 
had very little effect. Donaldson (Donaldson and Balfour 1968) likewise 
found that three and four year-old children did not differentiate
between "less" and "more11: of the fifteen subjects studied only one
gave consistently correct responses to "less" whereas the others showed 
a marked tendency to make the same response irrespective of which word 
was used in the instruction. Information gained from this type of prior 
assessment or training would then enable one to determine more clearly 
the reasons for any S ’s failure to conserve.
The second aspect of the language problem, that is, tue structure 
of the questions, has been considered to a lesser extent. Rothenberg 
(1969) has shown in her study on number conservation, among four and 
five year-old children that important differences occurred in the number 
of conservers identified, depending on the question or questions asked 
as well as on the number of transformations presented. The problem is 
seen in the format of the commonly posed conservation question, "Does 
this row (or side) have more, or does this row have more, or do they 
both have the same number (amount, etc.)?" (Wallach and Sprott, 1964; 
Zimiles, 1966). Questions such as this, which contains a number of 
separate parts, are particularly difficult for young children to remember 
because they are long and complex. Moreover, it seems unlikely that 
the Ss can reliably answer the three-section question with a single 
response. Hood (1962) has noticed, for example, that with this three- 
part question children tended to repeat the last thing they were asked.
This suggests that the extent to which children appear to be conserving
may depend on the order of the parts of the question. Two-part questions 
(Fleischmann, Gilmore and Ginsburg, 1966) tend to present similar problems. 
There is one further common type of question (Dodwell, 1960; Elkind,
1961b; Wallach, Wall and Anderson, 1967; Wohlwill and Lowe, 1962), 
which deals only with a single event. While this type of question has 
the advantage of presenting a single phrase short enough to be remembered,
it does have the disadvantage of tending to favour either a conserving
response or a nonconserving response by virtue of the emphasis in the
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question on "same" or "more". This single-question method can result 
in either many more or fewer conservers than might be obtained through 
more complete questioning of the child. Dodwell (1960), for example, 
when using two presentations with equal numbers in arrays that differed 
only in the nature of the materials, found a much greater percentage 
conserving when the Ss were asked if there were the same number in the 
two arrays than when they were asked which array had more.
Some investigators (Griffiths et al., 1967; Hood, 1962j Mermelstein 
and Shulman, 1967) have suggested that further changes in the conservation 
question format are necessary for one to be fairly sure of the real 
character of the child's thinking. H&G& (1962) has suggested that this 
can best be accomplished by presenting standard single-event questions 
in several forms for each problem.
Gruen (1966) has noted the varying criteria used in different studies 
to define conservation. Primarily, the difference is whether or not 
the Ss are asked to justify or explain their response to the conservation 
question. This criterion difference has tended to result in more conservers 
being selected when justification of the answer was not requested. Since 
most of the previous research has used either an excessively long question 
or a short but somewhat biased question to determine conservation status, 
it is understandable why these differences in the number of conservers 
have been found depending on whether justification was included. Changes 
in the nature of the conservation questions in the direction of providing 
a larger and possibly more reliable sample of responses to each problem 
may tend to decrease the discrepancy in the results found using these 
two definitions of conservation and still avoid the problem of false 
positives, noted by Shantz and Sigel, that has occurred when justification 
for determing conservation was not required.
Thus attempts to determine the effect of language on concept
through the means of requiring the subject to verbalize
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during the experiment have produced conflicting results. Wolff (1967) 
claims that verbalization like pretraining has a positive effect on 
concept while mediational ability is not related to performance
on this type of task, but Rommetveit and Kvale (1965) produce results 
which are not so clear cut.
Working with complex geometrical patterns to signal good and bad 
luck at a wheel of fortune^ these experimenters identify a "pre-functional" 
stage of concept formation, where it was f£>und-bhat asietrimental effect 
occurs if the subjects are first required to verbalize the difference, 
after sorting verbal descriptions of "good" and "bad" patterns. Furthermore, 
subjects who anticipated being rehearsed about the difference between 
good and bad wheels of fortune patterns had a successively poorer performance 
at sorting verbal descriptions of the differences, as their ability to 
sort actual stimulus patterns into appropriate conceptual categories 
improved.
Carolyn Stern (1967) also investigated the importance of verbalization 
in children's ability to learn problem solving strategies. Using treatment 
conditions including multiple and single hypotheses testing with and 
without speaking, she found that children taught to use knowledge of 
results to test one concept at a time scored significantly higher on 
post-tests than did those taught to test several hypotheses at once.
Also, a request that the subjects explain the basis of problem solution 
provided no reliable difference in the efficiency with which such problems 
involving simple materials are solved.
Confirmation that verbalization may produce a detrimental effect 
on concept formation comes from another study where it is hypothesized 
that concepts are formed without verbalization, and unsuccessful attempts 
to put concepts into words can destroy or distort the concepts themselves 
(Phelan 1965). Investigating concept -formatter* in ninety college students 
it was found that when correct verbalization followed correct concept
utilization facilitation in the application of the concept to new
situations was observed. £ u £. spurious rules can be developed from 
inadequate verbalization and these tend to get substituted for the incorrect 
but efficiently functioning concept and so lead to maladaptive problem 
solving behaviour. Consequently incompatibilities between the formal 
concept and the incorrect verbalization can result in their mutual negation 
leaving open no conceptual mode of approach and necessitating a new start 
in problem solving. Similarly, the experiment of Rasmussen and Archer 
(1961) which was based on Whorf's (1956) hypothesis that language determines 
the categories into which we place objects and provides the labels by 
which discrimination among them occurs, also pinpointed the danger of 
language training. Rasmussen and Archer (1961) compared the effects 
of two types of familiarization with randomly generated forms, language 
pretraining, which entailed learning a verbal lable, and aesthetic pre­
training, which entailed making aesthetic judgements. Surprisingly, 
the aesthetic pretraining facilitated performance in a subsequent concept 
identification task. The same forms were employed in both tasks, and 
the facilitation under aesthetic pretraining occurred when the shape 
of the form was the relevant dimension. To explain these results,
Rasmussen and Archer (1961) inferred that subjects making aesthetic 
judgements must attend to various dimensions of the stimulus forms in 
contrast to the others who probably responded to more limited aspects 
of the shape. In other words, those who learned the verbal label may 
have merely learned the minimum basis for discriminating between the 
shapes, while those who made aesthetic judgements may have noticed a 
multiplicity of aspects.
The above study was carried out with adult subjects, but Amster 
and Marascuilo (1965) have studied the effect on ten year-old children 
of instructional set on pretraining performance and subsequent learning 
of the mathematical concepts of set-union and set-intersection. Verbal 
pretraining was found to facilitate learning during pretraining, compared
with aesthetic pretraining. However, in the subsequent concept learning
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task, for which the same materials were employed, the subjects who had 
aesthetic pretraining the concepts more readily that those who
had rote-learning instructions during pretraining. This difference due 
to pretraining was only statistically reliable among relatively low socio­
economic status subjects in the condition that received a small variety 
of instances of the concept. The variety of instances presented during 
the concept learning task did not significantly affect concept -form&fctov'v 
per se, but generalization to new instances was significantly greater 
when the concept had been learned originally from a small rather than 
a large variety of instances.
Basing their work on a similar premise Kofsky (1967) and Prehm (1966) 
have investigated the effect of verbal pretraining on concept learning 
in culturally disadvantaged children. The former experimenter found 
that training disadvantaged children in labelling and discriminating 
component stimulus attributes resulted in greater attention to these 
attributes in inductive concept -jpormaia’ova but in no greater success in 
solving concept tasks. Prehm, on the other hand,found no difference in 
performance between subjects classed as high and low risk groups of 
becoming mentally retarded at some future time but his results do suggest 
that verbal pretraining involving verbal labfel, attention and control 
had a significantly positive effect on performance. Stern (1965) also 
found that young children give a superior performance in concept identifi­
cation tasks when they are allowed to rehearse the concept rather than 
its instance labels and verbal training has also been seen to facilitate 
transfer (Ervin, 1960), if several necessary conditions are present.
Wohlwill (1960a, b) has also produced results to show performance 
on his number tasks were not a mere reflection of the verbal labels 
involved but of a true concept. The same conclusion appears to be 
indicated by Martin's (1951) finding that children's spontaneous use 
of quantitative vocabulary in the description of pictures failed to
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correlate significantly with a more conceptual test of number ability.
Support for the notion that verbal labels may direct attention toward 
or away from criterial dimensions comes from work on relevant and irrelevant 
verbalization in discrimination and reversal learning. Milgram and Noce
(1968), found, with children aged seven years and mental retardates of 
comparable mental age, that verbalization of the relevant class of cues 
facilitated performance, that verbalization of one relevant and one or 
more irrelevant dimensions is also facilitative but to a lesser degree, 
and finally that verbalization of irrelevant dimensions only interferred.
Language is seen to be unimportant for concept formation comparing 
deaf and hearing children. Furth (1961), for example, found that in 
the performance of seven to twelve year old deaf children on three 
conceptual tasks, the lack of a capacity to verbalize did not, in itself, 
interfere with a general capacity for abstract conceptualization. Similarly, 
Kates (1962) discovered that deaf and hearing adolescents proceed in 
concept {e&rmv^ tasks by the use of similar strategies.
One important factor which influences the ability of children to 
verbalize the principle involved in problem solving is the abstractness 
of the material (Long 1939, Long and Welch 1941, 1942). Also, the subjects 
who were able to solve the simpler problems without a hint were seen 
to be more able to solve the more difficult second hierarchy test.
Further work on the ability to generalize a principle involved in
and in the configurational theories of thinking by Duncker (1945) 
and Wertheimer (1945). Maier's work on reasoning in humans indicates 
that when suggestions of "helps” were necessary to solve such problems 
as tying two cords together which the subject could not reach, the very 
"help" (E casually swinging one cord, or giving the subject a pair of 
pliers) which brought about the solution was not consciously experienced
solving problems concepts and how it is affected by the
experimenter giving help or hints is found in the work of Maier (1931)
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except in cases in which the solution appeared in steps.
In his configurational theory of thinking Duncker (1945 and Miller 
1951) speaks of a pattern in which the component parts of the problem 
are arranged, the reorganizing principles or directions imposed upon 
the components and the eventual restructuring of the components in a 
form that coincides with the form of the desired solution.
In giving his problem "Why are all numbers of the form abc abc 
divisible by 13?", Duncker compares seven learning situations, one where 
the subjects are not given any aid and six where the clue given to aid 
solution becomes more and more specific, and varies between ’the numbers 
are divisible by 1001' to 'look for a more fundamental common character 
from which the divisibility by 13 becomes evident'. The structural 
property becomes clearer when the subject considers the number 1001, 
that is abc thousands and abc units. Duncker interprets his findings 
by concluding that the material given is restructured according to the 
demands of the situation, that is, a solution always arises "out of 
demands made by what is required on what is given". This means that a 
solution which involves a recentering of the given material can be 
facilitated if the new concept is somehow brought into prominence, either 
by an explicit hint or by suitable variation of the material.
Further evidence to substantiate the critical role of language in 
concept learning is seen in the way relatively small changes in experi­
mental instructions yield highly significant changes.
Instructions may vary according to the amount of guidance, the 
specificity of information presented, the amount of information presented, 
the method of presentation and according to purpose. The first three 
dimensions are relative and cannot be described precisely except in 
connection with a specific experiment. The method of presentation may 
be audio, visual or audio-visual, while the instructions may be formulated
(ii) Concept function of instructions
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to achieve various purposes: (i) to acquaint subjects with the specific
stimulus material or the more general task characteristics; (ii) to 
acquaint subjects with the specific response or the more general performance 
desired; (iii) to present the subjects with information of a procedural 
type such as a strategy, or a method, to apply to the solution of a task;
(iv) to provide subject with information of a substantive type, such as 
an advance organizer or a principle, to employ in performing the task;
(v) to provide a set related to the recall or use of information or 
abilities, and (vi) to manipulate the level of motivation of the subject.
Purposes (i) and (ii) deal with clarification of the nature of the 
task and assume some degree of unfamiliarity of the task by the subject. 
Purposes (iii) and (iv) involve the presentation of additional information, 
usually designed to facilitate performances of the task by the subject. 
Purposes (v) and (vi) involve an attempt to directly manipulate the 
thought processes or perceptions of thb subject.
In 1932 the effect of verbal instructions upon the formation of 
concepts was investigated by Ewert and Lambert (1932). In their study 
of the influence of the set following minimal, standard and maximal 
instructions on the ability to transfer discs on circles in a certain 
way with the least number of moves, it was found that increasing instructions 
increaseduthe variability of the scores but decreased the average number 
of trials, the excess moves, and the learning time. A similar result 
was obtained by Steam and Keislar (1966) with children eight and nine 
years of age. The latter experimenters discovered that a group which 
had been taught the strategy of testing one hypothesis at & time was 
significantly superior to those children who were given an equal amount 
of practice with no special training as well as to those given task 
familiarization only. The children taught to test several hypotheses 
at one time were not found to differ reliably from these groups.
Intelligence and age, however, may play a part in determining the
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effect of instructions. Superior intelligence has been seen (Osier and 
Weiss 1962) to give subjects aged six, ten and fourteen years an advantage
actual problem solution. Under non-specific instructions the subjects 
of superior intelligence produced more effective concept ..
Under explicit instructions, however, the average intelligence group 
improved while those of the superior intellectual ability remained unchanged. 
Bittner and Sbinedling (1968) have also shown in their methodoligical 
investigation of the conservation of substance that younger first grade 
subjects are influenced by both instructional and task variations but 
as the children grow older (third grade) the importance lessens and 
several studies do show that conservation is positively correlated with 
intelligence and verbal ability (Dodwell 1960, Elkind 1961, Goldschmid 
1967, Hood 1962, Kfeasa^ y and Charles 1967).
Furthermore, Feigenbaum (1963) working with the conservation of 
discontinuous quantities has revealed how the child's grasp of the 
conservation concept tends to vary with his IQ and also with the nature 
of the concrete experimental operations; task parameters such as number 
of beads used and also container size differential were seen to be 
important.
The solution of problems and its relation to instructions has also 
been found to depend on whether the subject is encouraged towards 
analytic or non-analytic problem solving. Archer, Bourne and Brown (1955) 
in carrying out just such a comparison found that analytical instructions 
did not significantly improve overall performance but reduced variability 
and facilitated performance on the more complex tasks.
Although. Braley (1963) could find no difference in the efficiency
attainment procedures and those oriented towards problem solving, instructions 
which convey information about a principle have been seen by others to
in the problem finding phase of a concept ie-arvu*^ task but not in the
between instructions oriented towards concept
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facilitate initial learning and transfer, yet as Beilin et al (1966) 
found in their study on water level representation with six to seven 
year-old children, verbal instructions of the principle involved were 
inferior to perceptual confirmation training. In Fowler's study in 1931 
where he tried to teach three artificial concepts by different methods 
a combination of deductive presentation with explanation was found to 
be more effective than either working from particulars to generalizations 
or vice versa.
The importance of cognitive control of human behaviour has been 
described by Miller, Calanter and Pribram (1960) who stated that all 
human behaviour is controlled by a plan which in turn is comprised of 
strategies and tactics. Strategy refers to the control of the global 
units of behaviour and tactics to the specific units. Bruner et al (1956) 
reported the first extensive research with strategies in concept -jorm&tion 
and identified four strategies. Apparently the same person may use any 
of the four strategies depending on situational conditions. Not only a 
strategy but a pri'noip-le for securing information efficiently can be 
described and provision of this information to subjects markedly facilitates 
concept jg&rmVi^ over a short period of time. In one experiment, for 
example, (Hilgard, Irvine and Whipple, 1953) one group of subjects learned 
to perform card tricks by memorizing a sequence while a second group 
learned a procedure for determining the sequence. Initial Ic^vu 
was faster for the memory group, and there were no differences in retention 
of the first trick. However, significantly more subjects in the under­
standing group performed the second trick on the retention test and also 
demonstrated more transfer to new tasks where simple transposition was 
not an effective aid to solution.
This finding has been corroborated by Forgus and Schwartz (1957), 
Haslerhud and Meyers (1958) and also by ffisa&enralih (1959) who found that 
learning to learn a principle during training facilitated learning to
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learn a reversal principle during the transfer period.
The facilitating effects of the knowledge of a principle have also 
been demonstrated by Judd (1908) in his investigation of the relation 
of special training to general intelligence, by Craig (1956) in his 
experiment on directed versus independent discovery of established 
relations and by Hendrickson and Schroeder (1941) in their study on the 
transfer of training in learning to hit a submerged target, and by 
Klausmeier and Meinke (1968) in their manipulation of instructions which 
vary according to purpose and amount of information. In this last study 
one set of instructions outlined a conservative focusing strategy, 
another described the structure of the material and a third set presented
efficient for subjects (aged between nineteen and thirty years) receiving 
the principle; also the rank order of the effects of instruction from 
most to least efficient was strategy instructions, structure instructions 
and minimum instructions.
Another factor seen to influence the learning and retention of 
concepts is the effect of set. Reed (1946) has found it to affect college 
students1 ability to learn words and nonsense syllables while Callantine 
(Callantine and Warren 1955) showed that concept formation under single 
problem conditions was superior to that involving multiple problems.
Byers (1963) corroborates this in his study on strategies and learning 
set and Rosenbaun and Arenson (1967) in their experiment on einstellung 
by observation on the "water-jar" problem revealed that observation of 
a direct solution did not facilitate problem solving but that of the
indirect solution did hinder this activity.
In conclusion, it may be stated that very minor and subtle variations 
in experimental instructions may yield highly significant results. Due 
consideration should therefore be paid to every aspect of the way in
which the problem is presented to the subjects, to the manner in which
only mimimal information about the task.
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the subject is required to perform and to how he is required to communicate 
his responses back to the experimenter.
(iii) The effect on concept formation proficiency of relevant and 
irrelevant information
Between the ages of ten and thirteen years children have been seen 
consistently (Hagen 1967, Hagen and Sabo 1967, Crane and Ross 1967,
Maccoby and Hagen 1965, Siegel and Stevenson 1966) to show marked 
improvement in the ability to select what is relevant from what is 
irrelevant in various experimental situations. The results of these 
studies have been interpreted to indicate that young children's 
relatively inefficient performance in learning and perceptual tasks is 
partly due to their inability to focus attention on the relevant and 
irrelevant aspects of the task, but a further study (Druker and Hagen 
1969) discovered that the developmental change responsible for selective 
information processing did not involve improved visual discrimination; 
older subjects in this experiment were characterized by more efficient 
encoding and rehearsal strategies.
Attempts to show that concept formation proficiency is highly 
dependent upon the procedures used to present the information to subjects 
rather than, as has usually been contended, upon the strategies used 
to transform information into conclusions about the concept have been 
made by Denny and Gamblin (1965), who considered memory load and the 
form of information input. They gave subjects information in optimized 
or non-optimized form, presented when needed for use or prior to usage.
The optimized form of presentation and no memory load conditions were 
associated with more proficient concept formation when both these conditions 
obtained: 73% of subjects showed errorless concept formation supporting
the contention that proficiency is most iiapor.tarifiljy dependent upon input 
factors.
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Generally speaking, performance deteriorates as the amount of 
irrelevant information increases. Wallach, Wall and Anderson (1967), 
for example, induced six and seven year-old children into conserving 
a number of objects by a procedure involving experience with reversibility 
and feel that their success may have been due to leading the subjects 
to stop using misleading perceptual cues. Phyllis Katz (1968) also, 
in her study with lower class children on a perceptually oriented 
concept formation task with the stimulus dimensions verbalized in advance 
and positive exemplaries of the concept continuously visible to the 
children, found that while increasing the amount of irrelevant stimulus 
information elicited more errors in all age groups ’it; did not interact 
significantly with the developmental level. Response latencies of the 
older and brightest subjects increased with the number of irrelevant 
cues, whereas those of the less intelligent children did not, indicating 
possible developmental differences in information processing.
Similarly, Huttenlocher (1962) found that boys required to select 
correct blocks of a set with relevant dimensions of form and brightness 
performed less well when allowed to manipulate the blocks to construct 
instances for the test and it was surmised that planning of the manipu­
lative responses distracted the subjects from the task of remembering 
and interpreting the material previously presented.
Similarly, Petre (1966) examined the effect of amount of pretraining 
with identical and dissimilar stimuli on concept learning. He used 
stimulus equivalence training designed to facilitate performance on a 
subsequent matching-to-sample concept task in which correct matching 
was on the basis of size and linearity. Half the experimental groups 
(D.R.) received training based on stimuli identical with the concept 
stimuli and the others (G.F.) were trained on stimuli which were physically 
dissimilar but also either curvilinear or rectilinear. It is interesting 
that the control group did not differ from the combined experimental 
groups in the mean number of errors on the concept problem but the D.R.
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groups were superior to the G.F. groups.
The assimilation and utilization of information in concept j€dTV\ir\<j| 
under varying conditions of information presentation has also been 
examined by Sechrest and Wallace (1962). Their task concerned the 
attainment of a single two attribute concept by means of free selection 
from an array completely visible to the subject, and the four conditions 
of information transmission involved the initial positive instance alone 
and also accompanied by a list of the possible hypotheses remaining or 
eliminated and by exposure of the array. The groups did not differ in 
the number of instances required for solution or in the relevance of 
the first verbalized hypotheses. Inefficient performance was also not 
attributable to failure of information assimilation but to the fact that 
the subjects did not utilize all the available information. The third 
and fourth conditions also resulted in a significantly greater number 
of redundant hypotheses.
Concept learning and the degree of synchrony of relevant and 
irrelevant stimulus components occuring during the learning period has 
been investigated by Detambel and Stolurow (1956) who conclude that they 
are negatively related.
The effects of sequential manipulations of relevant and irrelevant 
stimulus dimensions or concept learning have been investigated by several 
experimenters. Kutz and Hovland (1956), using geometrical designs as 
the concept material verified the hypothesis that "learning would proceed 
more rapidly under a condition in which the instances of a given concept 
were presented one after another without interpolation of instances of 
other concepts as compared with a condition in which instances of several 
concepts were presented in an intermixed order". G^ngere-llI (1927) also 
investigated the mutual interference in the evolution of concepts and 
saw that a common element contained in a series of symbols was learned 
less readily when the same symbols had previously been learned in the
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formation of other concepts than when they had not entered into other 
concepts. Newman (1956) and Anderson and Guthrie (1966), among others, 
corroborated this finding. Utilizing a paired associate method with 
line azimuth and the position of dots as the concept determinants,
Newman found that the closer the grouping of representations of the 
same concept, the greater the liklihood that the responses to concept­
relevant features would be temporally contiguous.
Anderson and Guthrie used an alternating series in their study, 
in which one set of relevant cues appears at odd numbered trials and 
another set at even numbered trials, contrasting with a constant series 
in which the same relevant cues appear at every learning trial. Their 
main finding was the interaction in both training and test trials 
between type of series and the number of stimulus dimensions changing 
from trial to trial. For the alternating series, the group where one 
stinulus dimension changed between each pair of adjacent training trials 
showed fewer errors than the group in which three dimensions changed.
The reverse held for the constant series.
(iv) Feedback and reinforcement
Not only do the instructions given to the subjects, and the amount 
and type of information available influence performance in concept 
learning experiments, but feedback and reinforcement including knowledge 
of results have also been seen to play an important role.
Feedback may possess motivational as well as informational potential, 
and can be interpreted in terms of three intervening variables: response
availability, the need for centainty and the need for confirmation 
(Wallace 1964).
In traditional concept learning (of didactic concepts) knowledge 
of results provides the information necessary for the selection of 
relevant attributes and the construction of assignment rules. In schematic
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concept learning (concepts defined by objects in the environment) the 
necessary information is extracted from the unfamiliar stimuli themselves 
with no external feedback.
Brown, Walker and Evans (1968) have investigated schematic concept 
formation as a function of constraint redundancy and knowledge of results. 
Their study involved a modified oddity task requiring the assignment 
of stimuli to categories corresponding to three different schema 
families and revealed that a high level of schematic redundancy (70%) 
facilitated schematic ooncept formation and that a lower level (40%) 
prevented its occurrence, but it was also seen that didactic concept 
learning did occur at this level if knowledge of results was provided.
Similar results showing the effectiveness of feedback have also 
been found by Beilin (1966) in invariant area conceptualization and was 
seen to be superior to translocation and iteration procedures.
Reinforcement and praise also are influential. Hatans (1966), for 
example, required subjects to judge greater than, equal to, or less than 
of two stimuli described by one of two values of four dimensions according 
to inclusion or exclusion of these stimuli to a given concept. The task 
proved difficult for children even when possible alternatives of criteria 
were explained. However, in the course of trials without reinforcement 
which were given after reinforced practice, about one third of the 
elementary school pupils changed their performances in the direction 
of increasing consistency. In another study (Overbeck and Schwartz 1970) 
on the training of weight conservation reinforcement was also seen to 
facilitate o^nv&ii<n\ of the concept whereas active participation (as 
opposed to passive observation) by the subject did not.
In another experiment (Juzak 1955) praise and reproof used as false 
norms produced no significant difference in the generalization of 
learning concepts, although it was seen that when reproof was given in 
addition to praise the subject revealed a greater effort to perform 
correctly.
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Various other experimenters (Hovland and Weiss 1953, Smoke 1932,
1933, Braley 1963) have studied the effects of negative, non-reinforced 
instances in concept learning tasks with varying results. In Braley's 
study involving exclusion solutions, task performance was seen to be 
unrelated to conditions of reinforcement as well as to instruction and 
to type of concept. It was, therefore, hypothesized that failure to 
use negative information was related to fundamental information handling 
strategies, such that limited memory storage induces a trial and error 
search based on positive identification of the reinforced instances.
Negative instances may, however, be rather effective in tpemselves 
in the learning of concepts. Smoke equated the amount of information 
so that differences in learning could be attributed to differences in 
difficulty of assimilating information concerning what it "is not".
All hegative instances were found to be inferior to all positive but 
his results disprove the generalization that concepts cannot be learned 
from negative instances, since under appropriate conditions more than 
half the subjects were able to arrive at the correct concept exclusively 
on the basis of negative instances.
(v) The effect of training on concept learning studies
A further and important influence on concept learning proficiency 
is the effect df.experience through training. The type of training 
studied has varied and includes techniques such as nonverbal reinforcement, 
verbal orientation-reinforcement, verbal rule instruction, language 
activation, multiple classification, equilibration and cognitive conflict. 
Training effects on Piagetian concepts
Although most of Piaget's theory and research revolves around the 
characteristics of separate states he also tackles the transition 
mechanisms leading from one stage to the next.
The mechanism of transition which Piaget proposes is an equilibration
process. This process, continuously operating in all exchanges between 
the growing subject and his environment, is the propellant for change 
and transition. This continuous process of equilibration gives rise 
to successive, essentially discontinuous equilibrium states, that is, 
organized systems of actions (sensory-motor, perceptual, concrete- 
operational) whose attributes as systems are describable in equilibrium 
terms. As Flavell (1966) states "Piaget's analysis of transitions and 
states maps these two components, respectively, into a homogeneous and 
continuous equilibration process (the formative process) which gives rise 
to heterogeneous and discontinuous equilibrium states (the processes 
formed)".
The role of experience through training on the developmental patterns 
thus formed is not clear. Although the Geneva group considers experience 
to have a significant place in cognitive development Piaget seems lukewarm 
to the idea that experience alone may significantly alter logical thought 
development.
In support of this position numerous studies utilizing a variety 
of training techniques, as well as diverse populations, have been 
unsuccessful in accelerating the operational level of Piaget's stages 
or in facilitating the acquisition of conservation. Slater (1958), for 
example, has suggested that if the attainment of Piaget's stages can be 
accelerated and is not solely maturational, it would seem likely that 
children from different types of environments might attain the 
"operational" levels at different rates. Testing fifty infant children 
for conservation of number, one-to-one correspondence, seriation, cardination 
additive composition, and relations of equivalence, Slater found that 
environment does play a part, although not always to the advantage of the 
children from the "better" environment. The subjects from the 'good' 
homes produced more operational results and were vastly superior when 
language was necessary. The 'poorer' children, however, produced better
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results when their interests were involved in the experimental situation. 
Motivation was seen to be very important in that the ’poorer1 children 
performed better when they were required to share sweets or counters 
or the like.
Another study investigating the influence of the environment in 
fostering the development of 'operational structures' is the cross- 
cultural study by Hyde (1959). This investigator found that non-European 
children in Aden tend to acquire a basic numerical understanding 
considerably later than Europeans. The writer points out that this 
latter group was especially privileged. By the same token, the non- 
European groups were underprivileged and culturally deprived. There 
is therefore clear evidence of the influence of cultural factors on the 
development of operational reasoning.
It may be, however, that Hyde discounts too readily the effect of 
schooling on performance. Although many of her non-European subjects 
did not commence schooling until the age of 7 or 8, correlations of 
length of schooling with scores on Piaget's tests were not significant 
for even the European sub-group, although, at any rate at the eight-year 
level, all of these figures are positive and several are large.
The cogent and well designed study of antecedent processes in the 
area of number by Wohlwill and Lowe (1962) also produced negative results. 
In this study, training was directly towards conservation of number 
only, and the training procedures themselves were highly specifiable 
and of narrow compass. Seventy-two kindergarten children took part in 
the study, which was in the form of a non-verbal matching-from-sample 
type learning experiment, preceded and followed by verbal questions to 
measure the child's understanding of the conservation principle. There 
were four conditions of training, involving respectively the role of 
reinforced practice on conservation, of dissociation of biasing perceptual 
cues, and of inferential mechanisms based on the recognition of the
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effects of addition and subtraction of elements and a control group 
was also included.
The subjects as a whole showed an over-all increase in non-verbal 
conservation responses from a pre- to a post-test, within the limited 
context of the learning task, but there were, however, no significant 
differences attributable to the conditions of training. Transfer of 
conservation learning to the verbal post-test was negligible under all 
conditions, indicating that whatever learning may have taken place was 
of a rather restricted type, representing perhaps more the formation of 
an empirical rule than the understanding of a general principle.
Further support for Piaget's position comes from Beilin and Franklin 
(1962) in their study into the effects of age and training on logical 
operations in area and length measurement. It was found that length 
measurement is achieved prior to area measurement contrary to Piaget's 
description. For the first and third grade children the achievement of 
measurement is affected by the test itself and the third grade subjects 
were influenced further by instruction in measurement concepts. However, 
no first grade subject achieved operational area measurement even with 
training and instruction.
Support for Piaget's position that the young child is incapable 
of conservation is also fiajctftcoming. In a series of five experiments 
Fleishman et al (1966) showed that failure of the four or five year-old 
child to conserve continuous or discontinuous quantities cannot be 
attributed to a simple non-repetition response to set. Their results 
also indicate that the incidence of conservation cannot be increased 
by methods which employ emphasis on (i) quantification, (ii) continuity 
of a transformation or (iii) continuity of transformation combined with 
reduction of visual cues. They also found that the feedback method, 
judged by stringent criteria, was also ineffective, although when more 
liberal standards were applied, a medicum of success was achieved.
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Thus it would seem that Piaget's assertions are substantiated, 
and that it is indeed impossible to alter the sequence or bring about 
too rapid a change. After reviewing these attempts to train conservation, 
Flavell (1966) indicates, "Almost all the training methods reported 
impress one as sound and reasonable and well suited to the educative 
job at hand. And yet, most of them have had remarkably little success 
in producing cognitive change".
However, these conclusions are not unchallenged. Other investigators, 
utilizing a variety of techniques have induced different kinds of 
conservations and have succeeded in altering the sequence of Piaget's 
stages.
One technique, propounded principally by Jan Smedslund (1961 a, 
b, c, d, e, 1962 a, b), found to be successful in inducing conservation 
is that involving cognitive conflict. This investigator eventually 
reached the decision that induction of conflict coupled with external 
reinforcement was the key to successful training in conservation.
This theory involves a set of competing responses in a given 
situation which induces a conflict which reorganizes the intellectual 
structures and ensures conservation. This view proceeds along the lines 
of Piaget's equilibrium model and is generally consistent with it.
Piaget's discussion on strategies to decrease egocentric thought in 
the child provides an illustration of the similarity of the cognitive 
conflict position and Piaget's adaptation position. In particular, 
the confrontation of different children's viewpoints generates a cognitive 
conflict and facilitates the acknowledgement of another point of view.
Gruen (1966) points to the similarity of Piaget's and Smedslund's 
theoretical framework when he states that "Smedslund has used criteria 
more appropriate for assessing conservation as Piagfet defines it than 
do criteria by Frank" (Bruner 1964). But the two positions differ in 
respect to the origin of the cognitive conflict and perhaps this
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distinction highlights Piaget's negative posture on early training.
Tentative support for Smedslund is found in Gruen's (1965) study 
where five year-old children were given pre- and post-tests on conservation 
of number, and also conservation of length and substance. Half the 
subjects were given pretraining on verbal discrimination of length and 
number, and half were not. One third of the subjects in each of the 
pretraining groups were given direct training on number conservation, 
one third were exposed to situations designed to produce "internal 
cognitive conflict" and one third received no training at all on number 
conservation. It was found that neither confronting the child repeatedly 
with the invariance of numerical values in face of irrelevant perceptual 
changes, nor devising situations to induce internal conflict, is 
particularly effective in inducing number conservation. Over half of 
the subjects who received one of those two types of training did not 
make even one conserving response on the post-test of number conservation. 
But the direction of the results, although not statistically significant, 
tends to support the equilibrium-through-interndr-conflict hypothesis.
There was also a significant difference between the conflict and verbal 
training groups combined and the control groups which suggests that 
number conservation can be acquired without any kind of direct external 
feedback if one can induce appropriate cognitive conflict in the child.
Another study which artificially induced conservation of substance 
in a situation where the subject's expectation of an event was reversed 
was that by Brison (1966). Here the five to six year-old child had 
to integrate the elements of the conservation situation to obtain a 
desired reward. Half the experimental subjects showed evidence of 
acquiring conservation and the concept transferred to substances not 
used in experimental training.
These results are corroborated for the conservation of length and 
number by different experimenters. In Murray's (1968) study on length
- 58 -
the nonconservers trained by the reversibility and cognitive conflict 
procedure did significantly better than the untrained nonconservers 
on the Muller-Lyer task and on a transfer task with the same sticks 
distorted by the Oppel inverted T illusion. In Wallach and Sprott1s
(1964) experiment on number, first grade children were induced into 
conservation through experience with the reversibility of rearrangements 
which were regarded as implying changes in number. Such recognition 
of reversibility may account for the normal development of such 
conservations as those involving number and perhaps also amount.
This successful training procedure assumes to affect the cognitive 
structure^ emphasizes internal rather than environmental variables and 
claims success only with children who are in possession of the proper 
cognitive structure but have not yet reached equilibration. Kingsley 
and Hall (1967), however, offer an alternative hypothesis for the training 
failures which emphasizes experiential rather than internal variables. 
Their contention is that most of the training attempts which failed 
have ignored the large amount of background knowledge necessary and 
thus time needed to train children for conservation mastery. They tested 
this position through the use of training based on Gagne^s learning 
set procedure.
As a result of dissatisfaction with the application of standard 
learning theory principles, Gagne (Gagne and Paradese 1961, Gagne" 1962, 
1963, 1965) has developed an approach which analyses the material to 
be taught into a hierarchy of subtasks. Attainment of these provides 
a successful route to the mastery of a criterion task. In Contrast 
to Piaget's stage theory, Gagne^'s analysis of learning sets depends 
much more heavily on experience and ignores the role of maturationally 
related unfolding internal structures in determining acquisition sequence.
"It is of importance to note that there is no intention of describing 
a 'developmental sequence' relating the learning of an individual to
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his stage of growth or chronological age. Simple kinds of learning .... 
occur throughout the learning of an individual, no matter how old he 
may be ... At the same time it is inevitable that some correlation 
between the sequence of simple-complex learning and the sequence of 
earlier-later events will be present. The individual learns simpler 
things first, than more and more complex things; while all this is 
happening, he is also growing older" (Gagne, 1965, p.175).
This would suggest that not only could different types of conservation 
be taught quite rapidly but that they could also be mastered out of 
sequence as long as they do not require identical knowledge.
In their study to test the efficacy of this approach, Kingsley 
and Hall used Gagne's learning set analysis as a basis for teaching 
five and six year-old children length and weight conservation. As a 
result of their demonstration and their explanation strategy with 
continual eliciting of subjects responses, they obtained highly significant 
training .effects. In addition, experimental groups improved significantly 
more than control groups in substance conservation although this may 
have been due to the similarity of weight and substance tasks. Although 
only three of the appropriate seventeen subjects in the trained group 
resisted extinction, all fifteen of a "natural conservers" control group 
also extinguished.
Also convinced that reasoning and problem solving capabilities 
are best conceived to consist of repertoires of behaviour, modifiable- 
in accordance with principles of learning, instead of inaccessible 
structures and processes, and that basic changes in level of intellectual 
functioning are therefore not matters of "internal equilibration" but 
rather of learning as the result of "external reinforcement" is Anderson
(1965). This experimenter demonstrated that children can acquire and 
transfer a rather advanced complex problem solving skill when taught 
by the procedure of varying each factor in succession while holding
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all other factors constant. This is, of course, a classical strategy 
of experimental science and has been argued favourably by Bruner et al 
(1956). The skill is believed to be advanced and is thought by Piaget 
to appear naturally only at fourteen to sixteen years of age (Inhelder 
and Piaget 1958, p.335), but it is of value as it may be a "tactic" in 
a more sophisticated strategy.
Corroborative results also come from another study which, also 
shows that the acquisition of compourid concepts may be facilitated by 
previous training with simple concepts. Kendler and Vineberg (1954) 
required subjects to learn two simple concepts and then a test concept 
which involved combinations of simple concepts. The rate of learning 
the test concept was directly related to the number of simple concepts 
appropriate to the test concept which had been learned.
As previously stated in the section concerning the effect of 
instructions on subjects1 performance, concept learning proficiency 
may be facilitated by training on the principle or verbal rule involved. 
Beilin (1965) has firmly adopted this successful training procedure 
which provides the child with a statement of a rule to be applied to 
the problem in each instance of an unsuccessful trial response or a 
conservation task.
Although induction of conservation in this technique is based on 
the understanding of a specific rule and this is not possible in 
Piagetian reasoning, Beilin has shown it to be effective. In his study 
with kindergarten children on length, number and area conservation he 
used various training procedures - nonverbal reinforcement, verbal 
orientation reinforcement, "equilibration" and verbal rule instruction 
methods. The results indicate training to be effective in facilitating 
conservation performance but principally with provision of a verbal 
statement of the problem-solving principle. No conservation learning 
transferred to the area task and correct verbalization of the conservation
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principle, both before and after training, was less predictive of correct 
performance in conservation tasks than the reverse.
Beilin’s position is reinforced by further findings (Smith 1968), which 
suggest that verbal rule instruction improved the performance of both non­
conservers and transitional conservers of weight, whereas modification 
of Smedslund's addition-subtraction method produced no effect on conservation 
of either group. Neither group, however, proved to be resistant to the 
countersuggestion involved in a demonstration of apparent nonconservation.
Also Lister (1969, 1970) using a flexible teaching procedure including 
set experiences and explanations has shown that the concepts of weight 
and volume conservation can be taught to educationally subnormal children.
Her nonconserving subjects (aged nine to fifteen with IQs between 46 and 
75) succeeded in recognizing, generalizing and giving reasons for the 
conservation and post-testing as late as five months afterwards^ revealing 
that the concept was durable as well as generalized.
A further technique believed to facilitate the acquisition of con­
servation involves multiple classification, Sigel (Sigel, Roeper and Hooper, 
1966) assumes that one bases the learning of complex structures on simpler 
structures and claims that acquisition of conservation of substance follows 
the acquisition of simpler structures such as multiple labelling, multiple 
classification, multiple relations, and reversibility. These investigators 
argue that conservation is possible only when the child is capable of these 
three mental operations and their study shows that training on the three 
operations led to an increase in conserving responses.
A belief which postulates that focusing on the linguistic aspects of 
a situation and so decreasing the strength of perceptual cues will aid 
conservation is held by Jerome S. Bruner, (Bruner 1964, Bruner et al 1966).
In their study on fullness, Bruner and Kenny hypothesized that activating 
the linguistic aspects of the problem would minimize the effect of 
misleading perceptual cues and so facilitate acquisition of the concept
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of fullness. However, alerting their five, six and seven year-old subjects 
to the specific perceptual properties of the displays did not effect a 
significant improvement and the experimenters conclude that it "avails 
little to activate children to separate cues when their difficulty is not 
so much with the cues as such but with their combination".
One body of opinion which is not surprised at Bruner's failure to 
induce conservation and which also seriously doubts the techniques of 
Beilin, Sigel and Smedslund, is that of Mermelstein and his associates 
(Mermelstein and Shulman 1967, Mermelstein and Meyer 1969). These researchers 
firmly believe in the Piagetian theory and point out that whereas Smedslundfs 
theoretical position is generally consistent with Piaget's, Sigel, Bruner 
and Beilin present arguments for inducing conservation which are either 
inconsistent or only partially consistent with Piaget's viewpoint.
According to Mermelstein, Sigel's procedures are indeed necessary 
conditions for conservation of substance but they are not sufficient 
conditions. Sigel's training assumes that once the prerequisites for 
conservation have been met, the concept of conservation necessarily has 
been attained. Sigel further assumes that because the material is 
presented in a prescribed manner, the child will assimilate the material 
in the corresponding order. Such a claim is not consistent with Piagetian 
theory; for, if the child constructs his reality, it does not necessarily 
follow that he will assimilate the material in the same order presented.
They also cast doubt on the verbal rule procedure that Beilin presents, 
as this "training procedure appears to violate Piagetian theory". They state 
that the use of a rule in a training technique appears inconsistent with 
Piaget and go on "To begin with, the egocentric nature of the child's 
thought seriously hampers his ability to adopt another point of view.
Second, the syncretic nature of the child's mental structure with its 
behavioural manifestations of juxtaposition prevents him from accurately 
perceiving the rule because in juxtaposition the child does not take into
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account the necessary connections of the rule.” In a related study, 
Mermelstein and Shulman (1967) indicate that children under nine years of 
age perceive only the gist of questions or the events of the questions.
Since questions and rules are both statements implying necessary connections, 
it follows from this that two statements which stress "amount", for example, 
but in different ways, will be perceived as similar by the child. Thus 
the child will not truly understand a "specific" rule in that a specific 
rule implies a particular connection to an event. The child, on the other 
hand, acts as if all specific rules had the same connection to the event.
Also, Bruner's contentions on language training also appear to be 
inconsistent with Piagetian theory in that the resulting mental structure 
is a function of the language activated whereas Piaget believes that the 
mental structure precedes language development. Furthermore, even though 
the Bruner, the Beilin and the Sigel techniques employ more verbal content 
than Smedslund1s, the contention that the advantaged child should do better 
on these training procedures than the disadvantaged child is, according to 
Mermelstein, ill-founded.
Although advantaged children manifest language facility superior to 
disadvantaged children, Mermelstein seriously questions the impact of the 
difference at this stage of development. In other words, all children 
tend to rely more on concrete-manipulative experiences rather than 
linguistic experiences. And, further because of the syncretic characteristic 
of child thought, it is questionable whether the child's greater language 
facility can be appropriately harnessed to assist in the acquisition of the 
concept. For according to Piaget, without the concept the language facility 
cannot be appropriately directed. Consequently, it is contended that the 
particular population is of no consequence in an examination of the 
acquisition of the concept of conservation.
In summary then, because the concept of conservation derives from 
Piagetian theory and because the rationals for the Smedslund, Sigel, Beilin
and the Bruner training are judged by these authors to be not completely 
consistent with Piaget, they hypothesized that these training procedures 
would not be effective with a diverse population. Tests three weeks, 
two and a half months and five months after the last training session 
indicate that the "Piagetian" concept of conservation (involving 
generalizability and durability) was not induced by any of the training 
techniques on any of their different populations of nursery and kinder­
garten subjects. They found that, with time, improvement in conservation 
occurs, a result which is consistent with the contention that acquisition 
of conservation is a function of factors other than training.
Wohwill (in Bresson et al 1966), in his consideration of the role of 
experience in cognitive development, emphasizes that it is important to 
consider what actually is learned after any particular training. Similarly 
Mermelstein does concede, however, that because the other experimenters 
employ different criteria it is possible that the success which they 
report relates not to the concept of conservation of substance as Piaget 
sees it but rather to some other concept or some deformation of the concept 
Adding credence to such a contention, Piaget points to the different 
conceptions of conservation that he and Bruner have. Further, Almy et al 
(1966, p.41) and Gruen (1966) stated that the selected training techniques 
depend on whatever theory about the nature of human learning the 
experimenter holds. Directly testing such an interpretation, Gruen (1966) 
demonstrated that the different criteria and the different procedures 
employed by Bruner and Smedslund led to a different a^aesifitraltiron of 
of conserving responses. Although Smedslundfs different criteria offer 
one explanation of results, a difference between the cognitive conflict 
position and Piagetian theory which Smedslund has reported may provide 
an alternative explanation for the lack of success of his training.
Smedsliind (1962b) suggests that the organism-object conflict which he 
espoused is not of sufficient moment to cause a modification of the
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intellectual structures. He suggests that the organism-object relation 
is too neutral for the child and does not or cannot create the conflict 
in the child. In other words, he suggests a confrontation of different 
points of view among children rather than a confrontation of different 
viewpoints between the child and object as a necessary condition for 
modification of intellectual structures.
Sigel (personal communication to Mermelstein, 1968) also, in his 
latest research, is modifying his position on acquisition of conservation. 
Rather than suggesting that multiple labelling, classification, seriation, 
and reversibility training in that order facilitate conservation, he now 
suggests that classification and discrimination learning may be among 
the several variables for conservation. Supporting Sigel's most recent 
position, Meyer and Mermelstein (1968) have demonstrated that the "sequence" 
within Sigel's training technique does not play a role in the acquistion 
of conservation, and they have suggested that if training is successful 
classification may play a role.
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
In reviewing the relevant and related literature an examination was 
made of how the concept of proportion, in the arithmetical and more especially 
the physical sense, grows gradually in the child's cognitive development.
A demonstration of how the -|e>tiry\&tt©t'V of just such a concept is influenced 
by a variety of factors both verbal and perceptual was also made.
Physical proportion is typified by problems involving time, movement 
and velocity, the equilibrium in the balance, hauling a weight on an inclined 
plane, the projection of shadows, centrifugal force and compensation, 
space and quantity;
As the research on quantity concepts is most pertinent to the present 
study it was investigated most fully and great dftewti’ew  paid to the work 
on conservation. Extensive research by Piaget et al on the conservation 
of volume indicates that the child does not learn to conserve volume until 
about eleven or twelve. It is only then that children discover the true 
notion of volume; it is then that they find out for themselves, and often 
independently of what they are taught in school (a) how to multiply the 
length, height and breadth to ascertain the volume of a cuboid, and (b)
recognize that the space which it takes up in the water is invariant
whatever its transformations, and that the volume which it displaces is 
likewise invariant. It is only then that they learn to cope with the 
proportions involved.
It is also about this age that Bruner et al state that the child 
appreciates the idea of fullness, but the findings of this work is questioned 
and doubts are cast upon the experimental design and method. An under­
standing of fullness demands more than the recognition of the relationship 
of one volume of liquid to another; it requires the ability to relate 
the volume of liquid contained in a vessel to the total volume of the
vessel. Since this ratio is more abstract or symbolic, it would be
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expected that the child who had achieved the notion of volume would not 
necessarily be able to judge with equal confidence which of two containers 
was fuller, or which was emptier. The concept of volume as a multiplicative 
function of linear dimensions is a comparatively late acquisition, as also 
is the understanding of the equivalence of quantities of water displaced 
by equal but dissimilar volumes, but it should be expected that the concept 
of fullness would be achieved even later by the child.
Although the ability to conserve and also the appreciation of fullness 
appear to develop spontaneously in the child's cognitive development, 
situational factors such as language* instructions, information and rein­
forcement, and also experience and training do influence the 'jcnv\&4lio»* 
of such concepts. The issue is not clear, however, and contradictory 
results abound with some investigators succeeding in accelerating concept 
formation and others failing to alter the developmental sequences postulated 
by the Geneva group.
The study which follows investigates the proportions and ratios involved 
in judging fullness and also demonstrates the importance of the factors 
enumerated above in the performance of this task.
PART 2 
THE INVESTIGATION
CHAPTER V 
METHOD OF FIRST EXPERIMENT 
In the first part of the study two hundred and twenty children, 
one hundred and ten boys and one hundred and ten girls, aged five to 
fifteen years (twenty in each yearly age group), from six Northern Ireland 
schools (three primary, two grammar and one secondary intermediate) and 
also twenty adults served as subjects. The schools - Finaghy Primary 
School, Seymour Hill Primary School (Dunmurry), Tonagh Primary School 
(Lisburn), Larkfield Secondary School (Dunmurry), Annadale Grammar School 
(Belfast) and Friends' School (Lisburn) - were chosen in different areas 
so that combined they formed a fairly representative sample. On the other 
hand, the classes within each grade and the children within each class 
were chosen at random by the experimenter. The twenty adult subjects 
were a selection of students, laboratory technicians and secretaries from 
the University of Stirling, Scotland.
Only the five to eleven year-olds from the three primary schools were 
tested in the first instance but when it became evident that even the 
eleven year-old children did not fully understand the relationships involved, 
the older subjects were subsequently included in the study.
Half the children in each age group to eleven years (five boys and 
five girls) were asked "fuller" and the rest "emptier". The verbatim 
questions were as follows. E: "Is one glass fuller/emptier than the
other?" If S replied "Yes", E asked "Which one?" and then "Why?" If S 
replied "No" E asked "Why not?" The older subjects were all asked 'fuller'.
Forty-five pairs of glasses, filled to varying degrees with blue- 
tinted water were presented in three separate displays each containing 
fifteen pairs. The dimensions of the glasses are shown in Table 1 while 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show diagramatically the forty-five paira as presented 
in the three displays. Within the displays the combinations of glasses 
and water levels were arranged in such a way as to facilitate the changing
Figures 2, 3 and 4
The 45 pairs used in the experiment 
as presented in the three displays
DISPLAY 1 
Scale \ inch to 1 inch
1 2  3 4
5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15
DISPLAY 3
1 2  3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11
12 13 14 15
Figure 5
The minimum number of pairs necessary to represent 
all the possible combinations of features
Scale 1/6 inch to 1 inch
1 2  3 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23 24
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TABLE 1
NUMBER AND DIMENSIONS OF GLASSES USED IN THE DISPLAYS
Number Height Diameter
of glasses in inches in inches
6 6 1%
6 3 \h
6 4 3
6 2 3
6 2 1%
1 l h 3
of the displays.
In each pair the water level (W.L.), the height of the glass (H.G.), 
the diameter of the glass (D.G.), are all purely perceptual and can very 
independently but the volume full (V.F.) and the volume of unfilled or
empty space (V.E.), and also the proportion full (P.F.) and the proportion
empty (P.E.), all require some computational thought; they are also 
complementary to each other and dependent on how W.L. , H.G. and D.G. are 
combined.
All possible combinations of features were presented and as Table 2 
and Figure 5, show, the minimum number of pairs is twenty-four.
rvuvumuwi 2.H-
In Type 1 (pair ij) the glasses are identical and the water levels
are the same. Thus the volume of water and the volume of space in the
two glasses are the same. In short, the glasses are partly filled to an 
equal proportion.
Type II (pair 2) consists of pairs of glasses of the same diameter
but different heights. Since the water levels are equal, the volumes full
are also the same. The taller glass has a; greater volume empty and is 
therefore not as full as the shorter glass.
Type III (pair 3) pairs comprise glasses of different diameter but
the same height. The water levels are the same which means that both the 
volume full and the volume empty differ in the two glasses, but they are 
equally full.
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TABLE 2
ALL POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF FEATURES, EXCLUDING PAIRS 
WITH EITHER ONE OR BOTH GLASSES FULL OR EMPTY
Types
Water
Level
Height 
of glass
Diameter 
of glass
Volume
full
Volume
empty
Minimum 
number of 
different 
pairs
I S S S S S 1
II S D S S D 1
III S S D D D 1
IV S D D D S/D 3
V D S S D D 1
VI D D S D S/D 3
VII D S D S/D D/S 4
VIII D D D S/D S/D 10
Total 24
Key S: Same D: Different
Type IV represents pairs of glasses of different dimensions with the 
same height of water. Three possibilities exist here: (1) both the volumes 
full and empty differ with the greater volume of liquid in the shorter 
glass (pair 4). (2) The volumes full differ while the volumes empty are 
equal (pair 5). (3) Volume full and volume empty again both differ but 
in this case the greater volume of water is in the taller glass (pair 6). 
Since the water levels are the same, the shorter glass in all three 
instances is the fuller.
Type V is composed of identical glasses with different water levels 
(pair 7). Both the volumes full and empty differ, and the glass with the 
higher water level and greater volume of water is the fuller.
In Type VI we have examples of pairs of glasses of different heights 
but same diAmeters. In this type, the water levels differ. As in Type 
IV, three possibilities exist: (1) Both the volumes differ, and the
higher water occurs in the shorter glass (pair 8). It therefore has a 
lesser volume of space, and a greater volume of water and is fuller.
(2) Here again the volumes differ but now the higher water level and 
greater volumes of water and space occur in the taller glass, which can
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thus be filled to a greater, less, or equal proportion. The glasses in 
this pair were made equally full (pair 9). (3) The volume of water is
different but the volume of space is the same (pair 10). The taller glass 
with the higher water level and greater volume of water is fuller.
In Type VII, the glasses in each pair are the same height with different 
diameters. The height of the water also differs. There are four different 
instances of this combination of features: (1) The volume full is the
same in the two glasses while the volume empty differs (pair 11). The 
higher water occurs in the narrow glass which is fuller. The volume of 
unfilled space is greater in the wider glass. (2) Volumes full and empty 
differ and the higher water occurs in the narrow glass which is therefore 
fuller (pair 12). In this case both volume full and volume empty are 
greater in the wider glass. (3) The volume of water can;differ while the 
volume of space remains equal (pair 13). The higher water level and 
greater volume of liquid occur in the wide glass which is filled to a 
greater proportion. (4) Volumes full and empty both differ with the 
higher water level and greater volume full in the wider glass which is 
fuller. The greater volume of space occurs in the narrow glass, (pair 14)
In Type VIII, all three features differ within the pairs. There are 
ten different instances when ftater levels, heights and diameters all differ: 
(1) Volume full and volume empty the same, so that the glasses are equally 
full (pair 15). The higher water level occurs in the tall glass. (2)
Volume full the same and volume empty different. In this pair (pair 16), 
the volume empty is greater in the short wide glass, while the tall narrow 
glass has a higher water level and is fuller. (3) Volume full different 
and volume empty the same (pair 17). The higher water level occurs in 
the tall thin glass, while the volume full is greater in the short fat 
glass which is filled to a greater proportion. (4) Volumes full and empty 
both different. The higher water level is in the tall thin glass which 
can be filled to a greater, less or equal proportion to the short fat glass.
Here (pair 18) the glasses were made equally full, with the volumes full 
and empty both greater in the short wide glass. (5) Volumes of liquid and 
space both differ (pair 19). Volume empty is greater in the tall narrow 
glass, while the volume full is more in the short wide glass which is 
fuller. (6) Volume full different and volume empty the same (pair 20). 
Water level higher and volume full greater in the tall wide glass which 
is filled to a greater proportion. (7) Volume full different and volume 
empty the same (pair 21). Water level is higher and volume full more in 
the tall wide glass which is fuller. (8) Volumes full and empty both 
differ. Water height and volumes full and empty are all greater in the 
taller wide glass, which could be filled to a greater, equal or less 
proportion than the smaller narrow glass. The taller glass was made the 
fuller (pair 22). (9) Volume full the same and volume empty different
(pair 23). The volume of empty space is here greater in the tall wide 
glass. The shorter, narrow glass has a higher water level and is fuller. 
Finally in this last type (10), volumes of water and space both differ 
(pair 24). They are greater in the tall, wide glass, but the short narrow 
glass has the higher water level and is fuller.
Table 3 shows the eight different types of pairs as found in the 
three displays and Table 4 where the minimum twenty-four pairs were 
located in the displays.
TABLE 3
THE 8 DIFFERENT TYPES OF PAIRS AS PRESENTED IN THE 3 DISPLAYS
Types Display Number Pair Numbers
I 1 1 to 4
II 2 1 and 2
III 1 10 and 11
IV 2 3 to 5
V 1 5 to 9
VI 2 6 to 8
VII 1 and 2 12 and 13, 9 and 10
VIII 3 1 to 10
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TABLE 4
THE MINIMUM 24 PAIRS AS LOCATED IN THE 3 DISPLAYS OF THE FIRST STUDY
DISPLAY 1 DISPLAY II DISPLAY III
Pair No. Min. 24 No. Pair No. Min. 24 No. Pair No. Min. 24 No.
1 1 1 2 1 15
9 7 3 6 2 16
11 3 4 5 3 17
12 12 5 4 4 18
13 14 6 8 5 20
7 9 6 19
8 15 7 21
9 12 8 22
10 11 9 23
10 24
In addition to using glasses which were partially full, pairs were 
included to test the effects when one or both glasses in a pair are 
completely full or empty: all the eight types of pairs were represented
in this respect except types II, VI, and VII.
By presenting in display 1 more than one pair of a particular 
combination of features, where thought desirable and where the number 
of glasses permitted, it was possible to consider whether the results 
were due to sporadic chance factors or to faulty knowledge (Grossnickle F.E. 
and Synder J.H. 1939); it was also possible to test to see if varyin 
experimental parameters such as the size of container (pairs 1 to ^), 
height of water (pairs 10 and 11), position reversal (pairs 8 and 9) and 
ordering ejects (pairs 5 to 7) produced any effects.
The basic and underlying inherent in the task are thus
tested at the outset of the experiment. The child is introduced to the 
task via relatively easy judgments; all the glasses within each pair 
in display 1 are of the same height, and indeed except for pairs 10 to 
13 the glasses in each pair are of identical size and shape.
The fifteen pairs in each display were arranged and numbered on a 
table in the same way for each subject, and all subjects judged the 
displays in the same order (1, 2 and then 3) but the order of judging 
the pairs in each display was determined randomly, for each subject.
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Furthermore, the position of each individual member in all pairs was 
determined randomly, except where undesirable, i.e., in the pairs testing 
ordfcnintfj a-ffect&jposition reversal and changing the height of the water.
The adult subjects were given only the twenty-four minimum pairs and 
asked only to judge "fuller”, for reasons explained later.
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CHAPTER VI 
METHOD OF DEMONSTRATION EXPERIMENT 
In investigating where the ability of the subjects to judge what is 
involved in deciding which of a pair of glasses is fuller breaks down, 
it might be said that they either do not understand what to do or, on the 
other hand, that they cannot do what is required, and if they cannot do 
this, then what can they do?
In order to determine if in fact the original task, for one reason 
or another, was misunderstood, it was decided to give a short demonstration 
with explanations and then administer the original task, giving only the 
twenty-four minimum pairs and asking only "fuller".
General Procedure
Two hundred and twenty children aged five to fifteen years of age 
(twenty in each age group) and twenty adults served as subjects. Again 
the children were chosen randomly and in this study half the secondary 
pupils came from Grosvenor High School (Belfast), and the rest from 
Larkfield Secondary Intermediate School (Dunmurry). (The Primary School 
pupils were chosen from Brown Street P.S. and Glenwood P.S., both in 
Belfast, and the twenty adult subjects were a selection of students, 
laboratory technicians and secretaries from the University of Stirling, 
Scotland.) The demonstration was the same for all subjects and was as 
follows with E. speaking as follows.
E: "We are going to have a look at what we mean when we say that one glass
is fuller than another. First of all, here is a completely full glass; 
the water reaches right to the top of the glass; there is no empty space.
Next we have an empty glass; there is no water in it at all; it is 
all space.
Now, here are some glasses which are only partly full; they have 
some water and some empty space. This glass is half full; it has the 
same amount of water and empty space. This glass is more than half full;
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it has more water than space. This glass is less than half full; it has 
less water than empty space.
This glass is also less than half full (with reason) and this one is 
more than half full (reason given). If we put these two glasses together 
(E demonstrating) to form a pair, this glass (pointing) would be fuller 
than that one. Wouldn't it?"
E continued in this way with the remaining glasses, giving the 
proportion full in terms of "half full", "less than half full" or "more 
than half full" and then explaining Xfith reference to the V.F. and V.E.
E moved the second glass of each pair in turn to form the pair and then 
moved it back to its original position in the display.
The demonstration took the form of Piaget’s clinical approach to the 
extent that if S disagreed with E the explanation was repeated or even 
rephrased in order to try to convince S. The S was involved in the 
demonstration by being required in a casual way to agree (or disagree) 
with E.
Since the child in judging fullness must learn to resist the 
perceptual cues, water level, height of glass and diameter of glass, and 
consider the necessary relationships, it might be hypothesised that until 
he is capable of doing so he will tend to be led by Visible, cues. The 
pairs of glasses to be used for the demonstration were therefore chosen 
with respect to the influence of perceptual cues on the child's judgment: 
the three perceptual cues can be arranged in each pair either to bias 
the child in favour of or to militate against a correct solution. Within 
the eight types of combinations of features the number of Cues which
vary within each pair, that is, be fefre' aarne or differ in the two glasses 
of a pair, is constrained to different extents: in type I, none d u e l ’s ,
in types H  , Hi and V  , one , in types IV , VI anclVIttwo can differ,
and in type VIII all three factors differ within each pair.
Tables 5 and 6 show how the twenty-four pairs can be analyzed for
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TABLE 5
ARRANGEMENT OF PERCEPTUAL CUES
No. of 
free 
factors
No. of factors 
favouring 
correct 
judgment
No. of factors 
favouring 
wrong 
judgment
Type
No.
Display
No.
Pair Nos.
3 3 0 VIII 3 7 and 8
3 3 0 VIII 2 13
2 2 0 VI 2 8
2 2 0 VII 2 10 and 13
2 2 0 vir 3 15
1 1 0 V 1 5 to 9
1 1 0 V 3 11 and 12
3 2 1 VIII 3 2, 5 and 6
3 2 1 VIII 3 14
2 1 1 IV 2 4 and 5
2 1 1 VI 2 6
2 1 1 VII 1 9 and 12
3 1 2 VIII 3 3, 9 and 10
3 1 2 v i n 2 14
3 1 2 VIII 3 13
1 0 1 II 2. 1 and 2
2 0 2 IV 2 3
3 0 3 v m 2 15
TABLE 6
ARRANGEMENT OF PERCEPTUAL CUES IN PAIRS 
WHICH DEMAND EQUALITY OF JUDGMENT
N o . of 
free 
factors
No. of factors 
favouring 
one glass
No. of factors 
favouring 
other glass
Type
No.
Display
No.
Pair Nos.
0 0 0 I 1 1 to 4
0 0 0 I 1 14 and 15
1 1 0 III 1 10 and 11
1 1 0 III 2 11
2 2 0 VI 2 7
3 2 1 VIII 3 1 and 4
3 3 0 vm 2 12
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their arrangement of perceptual cues and provides the basis for the 
selection of the demonstration pairs: as seen in Figure 6 one pair was
chosen at random from each of the six different categories: (1) pairs
where all 'free' factors favour the correct judgment (2) pairs where 
2 out of 3 cues favour the correct solution, (3) pairs where 2 factors 
are free to differ and are balanced, (4) pairs in which the 3 factors 
differ and only 1 bias the child in favour of the correct choice, (5) 
pairs where all free factors militate against the correct solution, 
and finally, (6) pairs which demand equality of judgment.
In order that none of the demonstration pairs would be repeated in 
the testing later, any pair where V.F. and V.E. both differed within the 
pair was duplicated.
The first pair was representative of type V with V.F. and V.E. both 
different. This is a pair where all free perceptual factors favour the 
correct judgment. The second pair is a duplicate of one of the ten type 
VIII pairs (display 3 pair 5). This is a cade where 2 out of 3 perceptual 
cues favour the correct answer. The third pair is a duplicate of a type 
IV pair (display 2 pair 4) and represents an instance where 2 perceptual 
cues are free to differ and are balanced. Pair 4 is another duplicate 
of a type VIII pair (display 3 pair 9) and demonstrates the case when 
the 3 perceptual factors differ and only 1 favours the correct judgement. 
Pair 5 is a duplicate of a type IV pair (display 2 pair 3) and is an 
example where all free factors militate against the correct solution.
Pair 6 is one of the type I pairs and demonstrates equality of judgment.
Following the demonstration subject then moved to the testing pairs. 
In order not to lengthen the procedure more than necessary, it was 
decided to test only the twenty-four minimum pairs rather than the forty- 
five administered earlier, and to compare tesults for these pairs only. 
The position of the glasses in each pair was the same as in the original 
study.
Figure 6
The glasses used for the demonstration 
( Te^r t o mmiiviu*vi XI+ |?aurs)
full empty % full more than less than
h full \ full
No. 7 duplicated No. 20 duplicated No. 5 duplicated
No. 23 duplicated No. 6 duplicated No. 1 duplicated
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In order to prevent a serial effect, the order of the twenty-four 
pairs on the table was arranged in a random fashion and kept constant 
for all subjects and the order of judging the pairs, was also randomized 
for each individual subject.
Figure 5 shows the pairs and their arrangement in the display 
was as follows: 9, 1,2, 5, 24, 8, 17, 19, 11, 10, 18, 7, 23, 20, 15,
12, 21, 16, 14, 3, 22, 4, 13, 6.
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS OF THE FIRST STUDY
(a) Comparison between judgements of * fuller* and 'emptier1(for subjects 
aged five to fifteen years)
The number of subjects correct for each pair in the two independent 
groups was calculated (Tables 7, 8 , 9  and 10) and submitted to the 
Fisher Exact Probability Test (2 tail). The observed differences were 
no more than one would expect by chance: only three cells were
significantly different at the 5 per cent level of rejection and this 
is marked by an asterisk in the tables, five others differed at the 10 
per cent level of significance, and one at°^ - .025,
Close analysis of both the number of subjects correct and the 
reasons given reveals that the child thinks generally in terms of fullness 
when required to judge which of a pair of glasses if fuller or emptier. 
Indeed, no child at all under eleven years old mentioned the words 
'space1, 'air' or 'emptiness' and of the thirteen aged twelve to 
fifteen years who did, six were judging fullness. Since the two 
samples carry out the tasks in essentially the same way their results 
were combined and considered as one group for the purpose of analysis.
Also the adult subjects and those participating: in the second 'demonstration' 
experiment were asked to judge only 'fuller'.
(b) Preliminary Tests
The total number of children correct at each age level on each pair 
is shown in Tables 11 and 12, while Table 13 shows the results for the 
basic twenty-four pairs for all the subjects including the adults.
Examination of the pairs testing for s/AfiVttows ua ex£»eriYv>ewta.l
reveals that no difficulties arise from them and that the errors 
in judgments, observed were not due to these v/^fiaiions. . *
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TABLE 7
NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES FOR SUBJECTS ASKED FULLER
Age in Years
Type No. Display
No.
Pair No. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 4 7 9 10 9 8 10 10 10 7 9
T 2 5 9 9 10 10 8 9 9 7 9
3 4 8 8 10 9 8 9 10
-7 • UJ f *
7 6 9
4 4 7 8 9 10 8 9 6 5 6 8
II 0
1 4 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 0
III 1 10 3 5 5 5 3 2 1 3 3 1 5
111 1 4 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 0
3 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
IV 2 4 3 2 8 5 9 8 9 6 6 7 9
5 6 4 8 6- 8 9 9 7 6 10 9
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
V 1 7 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
8 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 9 8
9 8 9 8 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10
6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
VI 2 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
i 12 10 9 6 7 9 8 6 4 5 5 4
- VII
1
13 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
O 9 10 8 6 5 2 2 1 3 4 1 2Z
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
1 0 0 1 1 2 3 3 3 ns3* 2 6
2 10 10 9 7 5 7 6 7*0j9* 9 5
3 0 2 4 3 7 6 8 8 5 8 7
4 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 4
VIII Q
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
j
6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
8 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9
9 10 10 10 7 8 9 8 6 .7 10 6
10 10 9 8 6 4 7 2 4 7 5 5
- 82 -
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES FOR SUBJECTS ASKED EMPTIER
Age in Years
Type No. Display
No.
Pair No. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 7 7 9 7 8 10 9 9 9 7 8
T 1 2 4 9 10 9 10 10 10 9 6 7* 8
3 6 8 10 8 10 10 10 8 9 10 9
4 5 9 10 9 10 8 10 8 6 7 8
TT 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 4
2 4 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 3 2
TTT 1 10 3 5 6 7 6 6 1 2 0 5 0
11 4 5 5 2 7 4 0 2 1 4 1
3 2 2 0 1 1 2 0 3 0 1 2
IV 2 4 5 2 5 6 4 7 9 6 9 7 8
5 4 3 5 5 3 6 10 10 10 9 9
5 9 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
6 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
V 1 7 9 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
8 8 7 9 10 9 8 10 10 10 10 9
9 7 6 9 9 9 9 10 9 9 10 9
6 8 9 9 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10
VI 2 7 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
8 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10
1 12 9 9 7 7 10 9 5 3 4 6 5
VTT
1
13 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
VII
9 9 9 8 6 5 6 6 0 4 1 4 4
10 9 9 9 10 10 9 10 10 10 9 10
1 1 0 2 2 1 0 8 4 4* 4 3
2 9 10 7 7 8 7 2 8 4 6 8
3 0 0 3 4 3 4 9 8 8 8 9
4 1 1 4 2 2 1 7 1 4 1 5
v t t t o 5 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10V 111 j
6 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
7 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10
8 9 8 9 10 10 10 10 8 10 8 7
9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 6 9* 9 7
10 9 9 6 8 8 7 0 4 1* 4 5
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TABLE 9
NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES FOR SUBJECTS ASKED FULLER ON PAIRS 
WITH ONE OR BOTH GLASSES EITHER FULL OR EMPTY
Age in Years
Display
No.
Pair
No. 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Both full 1 14 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 10
2 11 6 7 3 5 2 3 1 3 4 1 2
12 5 4 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2
Both empty 1 15 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
One full 2 13 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
14 10 8 6 5 4 7 4 3 6 5 4
15 7 1* 3 1 2 2 0 2 1 2 2
13 4 2 2 4 1 5 6 2 3 3 3
14 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10
15 3 3 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 2
One empty 3 12 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
One full and 
one empty
3 11 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
TABLE 10
NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES FOR SUBJECTS ASKED EMPTIER ON PAIRS 
WITH ONE OR BOTH GLASSES FULL OR EMPTY
Age in Years
Display
No.
Pair
No.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Both full 1 14 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 9 10 10
2 11 9 7 6 5 7 5 0 6 0 3 4
12 8 5 4 3 4 4 0 5 0 3 4
Both empty 1 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
One full 2 13 7 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
14 7 9 6 5 7 7 2 7 2 5 4
15 4 7* 2 2 3 4 0 4 0 4 5
13 6 ,7 4 6 2 4 2 4 3 5 5
14 7 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10
15 2 5 1 4 0 1 0 4 0 3 4
One empty 3 12 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
One full and 
one empty
3 11 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
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TABLE 11
TOTAL NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES 
(N = 20 IN EACH AGE GROUP)
Age in years
Type No.
Display
No.
Pair No. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 11 14 18 17 17 18 19 19 19 14 17
T 2 9 18 19 19 20 18 19 18 13 13 171 1
3 10 16 18 18 19 18 19 18 16 16 18
4 9 16 18 18 20 16 19 14 11 13 16
1 5 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 5 4
11 z
2 7 1 4 1 2 2 2 2 0 5 2
10 6 10 11 12 9 8 2 5 3 6 5
III 1
11 5 11 8 5 10 5 1 5 3 6 1
3 4 2 1 3 1 2 0 4 0 1 2
IV 2 4 8 4 13 11 13 15 18 12 15 14 17
"5 10 7 13 11 11 15 19 17 16 19 18
5 19 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
6 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
V 1 7 19 20 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
8 18 16 19 20 19 18 20 19 20 19 17
9 15 15 17 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 19
6 18 19 19 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 19
VI 2 7 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0
8 18 19 19 20 20 20 20 18 20 20 20
1 12 19 18 13 14 19 17 11 7 9 11 91
13 19 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
VII
9 19 16 12 10 8 8 1 7 5 5 6
z
10 19 19 19 20 20 19 20 20 20 20 20
1 1 0 3 3 3 3 11 7 7 6 9
2 19 20 16 14 13 14 8 15 13 15 13
3 0 2 7 7 10 10 17 16 13 16 16
4 1 1 4 3 3 3 10 2 5 4 9
5 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
VIII 3 6 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
7 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 19 20 20 20
8 18 18 19 20 20 20 20 18 20 17 16
9 19 19 19 16 17 17 16 12 16 19 13
10 19 18 14 14 12 14 2 8 8 9 10
TABLE 12
TOTAL NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES ON PAIRS TESTING 
THE EFFECTS OF FULL AND EMPTY (N = 20)
Age in Years
Display
No.
Pair
No.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Both full 1 14 16 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 18 19 20
2 11 15 14 9 10 9 8 0 9 4 4 6
2 12 13 9 6 4 6 7 1 7 1 4 6
Both empty 1 15 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Both full 2 13 17 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 14 17 17 10 10 11 14 6 10 8 10 8
X 15 11 8 5 3 4 5 0 6 1 6 7
3 13 10 9 6 10 3 9 8 6 6 8 8
3 14 16 18 18 20 20 20 20 19 19 20 20
3 15 5 8 2 6 0 1 0 5 0 6 6
One empty 3 12 17 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
One full and 
one empty
3 11 17 17 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
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TABLE 13
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS AT EACH AGE LEVEL IN THE FIRST STUDY 
WHO JUDGED EACH OF THE 24 MINIMUM PAIRS CORRECTLY (N = 20)
Age in Years
Pair No. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Adults
1 11 14 18 17 18 18 19 19 19 14 17 20
2 5 0 2 1 6 2 1 0 0 5 4 12
3 5 11 8 5 8 5 1 7 3 6 1 10
4 10 7 13 11 16 15 19 18 16 19 18 19
5 8 4 13 11 18 15 18 12 15 14 17 18
6 4 2 1 3 3 2 0 4 0 1 2 12
7 15 15 17 19 19 19 19 13 12 20 19 20
8 18 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 17
9 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 11
10 18 19 19 20 20 20 20 18 20 20 20 17
11 19 18 13 14 20 17 11 8 8 11 9 12
12 19 16 12 10 15 8 1 7 5 5 6 11
13 19 19 19 20 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20
14 19 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
15 1 0 3 3 2 3 11 7 7 6 9 14
16 19 20 16 14 20 14 8 15 13 15 13 14
17 0 2 7 7 8 10 17 16 13 16 16 16
18 1 1 4 3 1 3 10 2 5 4 9 11
19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18
21 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 19 20 20 20 19
22 18 18 19 20 20 20 20 18 20 17 16 18
23 19 19 19 16 20 17 16 13 16 19 13 14
24 19 18 14 14 19 14 2 11 8 9 10 12
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(c) Comparison between the judgments of the Grammar School and the 
Secondary Intermediate pupils
The number of secondary school age children correct for each pair was 
calculated (Tables 14 and 15) and submitted to the Fisher Exact Probability 
Test (2 tail). Those cells which differed significantly at the 0.05 level 
of rejection are marked in the tables with an asterisk but it is clear 
that the observed differences are no more than one would expect by chance.
The Mann Witney U test (2 tail) was also carried out on the total 
number of pairs correct for each subject and revealed that the two 
populations do not differ at any of the four age levels at the 0.05 level 
of rejection.
Table 16 and figure 7 also give the average number of pairs correct 
for the two populations. Again it is seen that no obvious difference 
occurs except that the grammar school subjects at year 12 seem somewhat 
superior but the situation is reversed at year 15.
(d) The influence of perceptual cues on judgments of fullness
Since the child, in judging fullness, must learn to resist the 
perceptual cues, water level, height of glass and diameter of glass, and 
consider the necessary relationships, it might be hypothesized that until 
he is capable of doing so he will tend to follow visible cues.
The three perceptual cues can be arranged in each pair either to bias 
the child in favour of a correct judgment or to militate against a correct 
solution. Within the eight types of combinations of features the number 
of factors which vary within each pair, that is, differ »►  be the 
sms in the two glasses of a pair, is constrained to different extents: 
in type I none differs , in types n , ur and V  one differs , in types 
W ,  VI andVIItwo m m  diffe^and in type VIII all three factors differ 
within each pair.
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TABLE 14
NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES FOR THE TWO GROUPS 
OF CHILDREN AT SECONDARY SCHOOL
Type
No.
Display
No.
Pair
No.
Intermediate Grammar
12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15
1 9 9 8 9 10 10 6 8
2 10 7 7 10 8 6 6 7
I 1
3 10 *10 8 10 8 *6 8 8
4 7 *8 7 9 7 *3 6 7
1 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 1
II L
2 0 0 4 0 2 0 1 2
10 3 4 3 3 2 1 3 2
III 1 11 1 2 2 1 4 1 4 0
3 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 1
IV 2 4 6 8 8 10 6 7 6 7
5 9 8 10 10 8 8 9 8
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
V 1 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
8 9 10 10 9 10 10 9 8
9 10 9 10 10 9 10 10 9
6 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10
VI 2 7 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
8 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10
12 5 7* 5 7* 2 *2 6 *2
1
13 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
VII
9 2 2 2 3 5 3 3 3I
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10
1 4 1* 4 5 3 *6 2 4
2 7 6 8 7 8 7 7 6
3 7 6 9 8 9 7 7 8
4 1 2 2 4 1 3 2 5
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
VIII 3 6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
7 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10
8 10 10 9 9 8 10 8 7
9 2 7 9 6 10 9 10 7
10 2 4 4 5 6 4 5 5
TABLE 15
TOTAL NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES ON PAIRS WITH 
ONE OR BOTH GLASSES FULL OR EMPTY
Display Pair Intermediate Grammar
No. No.
12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15
Both full 1 14 9 10 9 10 9 8 10 10
0 11 2 2 2 3 7 2 2 3
12 2 0 2 3 5 1 2 3
Both empty 1 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
One full 2 13 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
14 4 3 4 4 6 5 6 4
15 2 0 2 3 4 1 4 4
3 13 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 4
14 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10
15 1 0 1 3 4 0 5 3
One empty 3 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
One full or 
one empty
3 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
TABLE 16
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PAIRS CORRECT FOR GRAMMAR 
AND SECONDARY INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL SUBJECTS
12 13 14 15
Intermediate School 28.5 28.6 30.6 31.8
Grammar School 31.7 28.4 30.5 29.6
Figure 7
The average number of pairs correct for the 
Grammar and Secondary Intermediate School subjects
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Table 17 shows the different trends in results observed while tables 
5 and 6 earlier show how the forty-five pairs can be analysed for their 
arrangement of perceptual cues.
The Spearman Rank Correlation Co-efficient between the subjects' 
judgments and the effect of perceptual cues was determined for each age 
level and is shown in Table 18. All the correlation between the subjects' 
judgements and the influence of perceptual indices are positive and 
significantly greater than zero at °^ = 0.05 (indeed p is less than 0.01 in 
each case except that of the five year olds with the pairs testing equality).
It might have been expected that the influence of perceptual indices 
would decrease with age. However, this trend did not occur and the older 
children are still heavily dependent upon "how the glasses look". Closer 
examination of the results corroborates this observation.
1. The pairs in which all perceptual features are free to vary and do so in 
such a way that they favour the correct response, proved to be very easy indeed 
for all the subjects. There appears to be no difference between the pairs 
where D.G. was the same, and where H.G. and W.L. were in favour of the correct 
glass, and those where H.G. was the same and D.G. and W.L. were in favour.
All seem to be judged with equal facility. There was one notable exception, 
however: pair 15 display 3, in which H.G. and D.G. favoured the mcorracfc
answer but where W.L. was equal, proved extremely difficult, even for the 
older children. The fuller glass was full to the brim but had a smaller 
volume of water. Some of the subjects who erred said that the glasses were 
equally full, while others judged that the taller glass with the wider 
diameter and greater volume of liquid was the fuller.
2. When two out of three perceptual indices favour the correct judgment,
it seems that the task is easy so long as W.L. and D.G. are the two which
favour, thus making the fuller ,glass contain the greater volume of water.
(iw
TypeVHTpairs 5 and 6^and pair 14 display 3 all represent pairs of this type 
and all are judged correctly by most subjects. On the other hand, when W.L.
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TABLE 17
TRENDS OBSERVED IN RESULTS
Type No. Display No. Pair Nos.
Majority of subjects V 1 5 to 7
judged correctly VI 2 6 and 8
VII Z 10 and 13
VIII 3 5 to 8
1 14 and 15
2 13
3 11, 12 and 14
Number of subjects I 1 1 to 4
correct increases IV X 4 and 5
with age V 1 8 and 9
VIII 3 1, 3 and 4
Number of subjects VII 1 9 and 12
correct decreases VIII 3 2, 9 and 10
with age 2 11, 12, 14 and 15
Majority of subjects II 2 1 and 2
judged wrongly III 1 10 and 11
IV 2 3
VI 2 7
3 13 and 15
TABLE 18
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE SUBJECTS' 
JUDGMENTS AND THE INFLUENCE OF PERCEPTUAL CUES
Age in 
years
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Pairs 
testing 
equality oi 
judgement
.523 .889 .897 .895 .910 .876 .786 .808 .785 .842 .712
Remaining 
32 pairs
.855 .565 .682 .726 .737 .686 .707 .655 .841 .657 .688
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and H.G. are for the correct response and D.G. is against the task is not 
so easy for the child, and the number of subjects correct decreases with age. 
The glass which is fuller has the same V.F. and a smaller V.E. than the 
other glass, as represented by type VIII pair
3. When two factors differ and one is for, the other against the correct
solution difficulty of judgment seems to depend on the particular factors
(dizft&ij 2)
involved. In type VI pair 6jf, for example, where D.G. is the same, and W.L.
is for and H.G. against and where the fuller glass thus has the greatest
volume of water, the children find no difficulty in responding correctly.
2)
However, when, as in type IV pairs 4 and %  W -L - is the same and H.G. is 
for and D.G. against the younger subjects tend to err in their judgments.
They reason that since the W.Ls are equal the glasses are full to the same 
proportion. The older children, however, realize that the wider glass 
contains more liquid and so they say it is fuller.
When H.G. is the same and W.L. is for and D.G. is against the correct 
judgment a different patterning of results emerges. In type VII pairs 12 
and 9^the number of Subjects correct decreases markedly with age. In pair 
12 both glasses contain the same amount of water and in pair 9 the fuller 
glass has a smaller V.F. Fewer older children judge pair 9 correctly 
because they argue that it is fuller because it contains more liquid. In 
both pairs the younger children judge correctly by simply responding as 
the perceptual indices dictate: W.L. is more important to the younger
child than D.G.
4. When only one of the three factors suggests the correct judgment the
task, as is expected, proves relatively difficult. Differences in responding
as age increases once again depends on which factors bias for or against
the correct member. When W.L. and H.G. militate against the right choice,
(cUtfslzy V
and D.G. biases in favour of it, as in type VIII pair 3j, the younger subjects 
tend to choose the taller glass with the higher W.L. and so he judges 
incorrectly. The older child estimates the proportions full sufficiently
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accurately to judge correctly but his final choice depends on the volume 
rather than the fractions calculated.
When W.L. is for and H.G. and D.G. are against t-hp rnrrprt- TuHffmpnf-
child arrives at the correct solution while the older child does not. This 
is to be expected in view of earlier pairs where it was seen that W.L. is 
important to the younger subjects while D.G. seems to be most influential 
in determining the judgments of the older children. In pair 9, the glasses 
contain the same amount of water, but in pairs 10 and 14 the fuller glass 
holds the smaller V.F. The latter, as should now be obvious, induces 
more incorrect responses in the older subjects than the former.
Finally, when H.G. is 'for' but W.L. and D.G. are ’against1, the task 
proves very difficult for all the children. This is as would be expected 
since the younger subjects appear to be influenced by W.L. to a large 
extent while the older subjects pay greater attention to D.G. and in pair 
13 display 3, where this arrangement of features occurs, it is clear that 
the fuller glass contains less liquid.
5. When all the 'free' factors, one, two or three, militate against the 
correct judgment the task is difficult for all the children. In type II
pairs 1 and 2/W.L. and D.G. are the same in each pair and H.G. is against 
the correct choice. Almost all the children recognise the equality of 
volume and so conclude that the glasses are full or empty to the same
judgment: W.L. is the same but H.G. and D.G. are against and the fuller
glass has less liquid. As in earlier instances the younger children tend 
to agree on equality as determined by the W.Ls while the older subjects 
state that the glass with the wider diameter and larger volume full is 
filled to a greater proportion. Both groups, of course, judge erroneously.
When three factors differ within a pair (Example: Pair 15 display 2)
as represented by pair 14 display 2, and type VIII
proportion.
2.)
both bias against the correct
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and all militate against the correct judgment the majority of all the 
children tend to choose the wrong glass as fuller.
6. The pairs requiring equality of judgment on the part of the subjects 
can also be ordered with respect to the influence of water level, height 
of glass and diameter of glass.
(a) When all three factors are the same in each member of a pair as in
trouble in judging equality. Where some children erred it was generally 
not due to inability to recognize equality but rather due to the meticulous 
care and caution exercised in comparing the water levels, and perhaps 
concluding that there "was a tiny dribble" or "a few drops more" in one of 
the glasses. It is very difficult to ensure that the heights of water 
are exactly level. Equality on both the part of the experimenter and the 
subjects is, to a certain extent, a subjective thing. It is important to 
point out in this respect that once again the majority of subjects who 
judged equality, did not point out specifically that the glasses were filled 
to an equal proportion but were satisfied simply that the volumes were 
equal. (The results of type H  pairs confirm this observation.)
(b) When only one perceptual indice differs within a pair, most of the 
children tend to choose whichever glass looks fuller. In type III, pairs
glass with the greater volume of water. Here again, though, scrupulous 
care in examining the water levels was evident and a few subjects concluded 
that the narrower glass contained a "tiny drop" or a "wee bit" more, or 
that it was a "wee bit higher" and so choose it as fuller.
(c) When two factors differ and both favour the same glass as fuller 
the child finds it extremely difficult to see that the glasses are equally
the taller glass of same diameter with the higher water level and greater 
volume as fuller.
display 1, the children find little
l)
most of the children who erred chose the wider
full. In type VI pair 7^ for example, even all the older children choose 
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(d) When three factors differ and two favour one glass and the third the 
second glass, it is very difficult for the child to see that both glasses 
are equally full. In type VIII pairs 1 and 4^ H.G. and W.L. tend to 
suggest that the tall slim glass is fuller while D.G. favours the short 
wide glass. In both these pairs there is a sudden rise at age eleven in 
the number of subjects who judge correctly. Only the oldest children, as 
suggested already, can take into consideration the compensatory relation­
ships involved. However, once again they do so in order to equate volume 
rather than proportions full or empty.
It is interesting to note that more children reason that the short 
wide glass is the fuller in pair 4 than in pair 1, since the greater 
volume of liquid does occur in this glass in pair 4, while the volume full 
(empty) in pairs 1 and 4 are equal. Both pairs, one representing the 
ratio of one half, and the other three quarters are very difficult indeed 
for the children.
(e) When all three factors differ within a pair and all suggest that one 
particular glass is fuller than the other, it is difficult for the children 
to judge equality. In pair 12 display 2, for example, where both glasses 
are full to the brim, most of the subjects choose the tall, wide glass 
with the higher water and greater volume as the fuller. In fact, all those 
who erred chose this glass as being filled to a greater proportion, and 
fewer older children judged correctly than younger. However, it could be 
said, without much doubt, that if there had been a pair where all three 
factors favoured one glass as fuller, but where equality of judgment was 
required, and where the glasses were only partially filled, fewer children 
in all the age groups would have judged correctly.
The importance of perceptual factors on the child's judgment of which 
of two vessels is fuller or emptier can be summarized as follows. The 
height of the containers per se appears to influence the judgments very 
little: the children in all the age groups pay greatest attention to the
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dimensions of the 'volume full', that is, diameter of the glass and height 
of water or water level. Water level appears to be the most important 
perceptual determinant, especially for the younger children, and when it 
is equal the diameter of the container is taken into account. This finding 
is in accord with Lumsden's study (Lumsden and Poteat, 1968) which revealed 
a disproportionate relevance of the vertical dimension in the concept of 
"bigger" for young children. However, more important than either of these 
features individually is how they combine to produce the volumes of liquid 
contained. Most of the two hundred and twenty children appear to be 
influenced by the amount of liquid the glasses contain, and believe that 
the fuller glass is the one which holds the greater volume of water.
An interesting observation emerges as the children grow older; 
convinced that they are required to judge which container holds more water, 
the older subjects learn to take account of the compensatory relationships 
involved when W.L. and D.G. both differ within a pair, and the diameter 
of the glasses seems to become more important in their estimations than 
even the water levels. The younger children can co-ordinate several 
dimensions and respond to the volumes full in global terms, e.g. "it has 
more", "it is bigger" or "it is poured in biggest"; only one five year 
old, and four six year olds in any one pair, qualified their judgments 
further by pointing out a single feature of the pairs. As the children 
mature and their experience widens, they become capable of reasoning 
verbally and in a more complicated fashion. However, even at age fifteen, 
the child still seems to believe that fuller means "more liquid". The 
belief in this is so firm that, as we have seen, the older children judged 
some pairs wrongly which most of the younger subjects, simply by yielding 
to perceptual cues, judged correctly.
A rather surprising effect of this is produced when the average 
number of pairs correct out of forty-five is caluclated for each age 
group (Table 19 and figure 8). The number of pairs where the number of
Figure 8
The average number of pairs correct for each age level
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TABLE 19
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PAIRS CORRECT FOR EACH AGE GROUP
Age 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
No. of 
pairs
29.7 30.5 31.0 30.5 30.5 31.1 29.4 30.3 28.5 30.5 30.7
subjects correct decreases balances out with those where the number 
increases to produce the above table, where at first glance it would 
appear that the child makes no progress at all, as he grows older, in his 
ability to judge fullness.
The older subjects appear well equipped to estimate the physical 
proportions involved but they do not realize that they must take into 
account the ratios existing between the volume of liquid contained and 
the total volume of the container; that is they do not fully understand 
the concept of ratio through the idea of fullness.
(e) The Adult Subjects
Having tested five to fifteen year olds on all possible combinations 
of features with duplications and having reached the above conclusion 
it was decided to carry out a further study and also include adults, but 
this time using only the minimum twenty-four pairs and asking only 'fuller1.
For the purpose of comparison the data obtained for the children had 
to be reorganized and the results for the surplus twenty-one pairs 
excluded.
Tables 13, 20 and 21 give the results for the minimum twenty-four 
pairs for all the subjects including adults who participated in the non­
demonstration study. As can be seen from Tables 13 and 19 there is an 
improvement in performance between the fifteen year oltfs and the adults 
although the judgments are still not perfect but Table 21 demonstrates 
that the performance remains closely dependant upon perceptual cues.
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TABLE 20
AVERAGE NUMBER CORRECT OUT OF THE MINIMUM 24 PAIRS 
FOR EACH AGE GROUP IN THE ORIGINAL EXPERIMENT
Ages 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Adults
Average 15.3 15 15.65 15.4 15.9 16.05 15.65 15.35 15.4 16.05 16 18.7
TABLE 21
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1 TAIL) BETWEEN PERCEPTUAL 
CUES AND THE JUDGMENT OF FULLNESS FOR THE 24 ESSENTIAL PAIRS 
IN THE FIRST STUDY = .05)
Ages 5 Equality Pairs 19 Remaining Pairs
5 0.975* 0.3928*
6 0.825 0.6755*
7 0.6 0.7115*
8 0.675 0.822*
9 0.675 0.874*
10 0.675 0.7975*
11 0.2 0.8275*
12 0.7952 0.6636*
13 0.2 0.6810*
14 0.7952 0.6033*
15 0.1539 0.5508*
Adults 0.225 0.6955*
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION OF THE ORIGINAL STUDY 
The present experiment compared with that by Bruner and Kenney
The most crucial and deliberate differences between the two studies, 
apart from the extension of the present study to include twelve, thirteen, 
fourteen, fifteen year olds, and later adult subjects, are briefly as 
follows. Bruner and Kenney presented only eleven pairs of glasses chosen 
"with malice of aforethought” but apparently without evidence to substan­
tiate the choice of pairs; only on the basis of results obtained from 
a thorough investigation presenting all possible combinations of features 
could one be justified in selecting certain pairs.
In order to differentiate between sporadic, chance errors and 
persistent ones due to faulty knowledge, more than one example of each 
type should be included in the study. Also, the possible effect of 
varying experimental parameters, such as size of container, height of 
water, position reversal and transitivity, should be examined. Since 
the experiment assumes that the child has mastered these elementary 
abilities we, unlike Bruner and Kenney, in our first display included 
pairs to test these skills in order that we might be confident that no 
difficulties arise from them.
Brnner and Kenney do not appear to have taken adequate precautions 
against possible contamination of results by extraneous factors; while 
we determined the position of each individual pair member by chance, 
(except when in some of the preliminary tests it was undesirable to do 
so) all the tall glasses in Bruner and Kenney's pairs are positioned on 
the left. Furthermore, their study also runs the risk of a serial effect 
by administering the pairs in the same sequence to all subjects. Although 
in the present study the fifteen pairs in each display* are arranged and 
numbered on a table in the same way for each subject, and though all 
subjects judged the displays in the ottder 1, 2 and 3, the order of
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judging the pairs within each display was randomized for each subject.
The choice of proportions in the original study may also be 
questioned; most of the partially filled glasses appear to be exactly 
half-full. A study to determine how the general concept of ratio is 
acquired should include more than one proportion, especially when that 
proportion is an 'easy1 one; it is only when the child has mastered more 
than one example that he can be said to have learned the general principle. 
The use of coloured water rather than ordinary water should render the 
glasses more attractive to the children and should guarantee that they 
see the water levels more clearly.
A further criticism of the previous study concerns the questions 
asked of the subjects. Bruner and Kenney used questions involving a 
number of separate parts (a sequence of questions about fullness/emptiness) 
and as stated earlier this type of questioning is particularly difficult 
for young children to remember because of its length and complexity.
Also research cited earlier (Hood, 1962, Fleishmon et al, 1966) indicates 
that the extent to which children appear to be performing correctly may 
depend on the order of the parts of the question. We simplified the 
wording in the present experiment to deal with only a single event.
This has the advantage of presenting a single phrase short enought to be 
remembered, and although if we extend Rothenberg's (1969) argument, it 
may have the disadvantage of tending to -favour a positive response by 
virtue of the emphasis in the question of a comparative rather than an 
equality judgment we feel it to be an improvement. It is also 
tentatively suggested that the failure to achieve linguistic activation, 
one aspect of the study not repeated in the first experiment, may have 
been due to alerting the children's attention to the different features 
after, rather than before, they judged for fuller or emptier.
The issue, hwwever, becomes more critical when we consider that 
Bruner and Kenney distinguish between the reasoning involved in judgments
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of fuller and that determining judgements of emptier from results obtained 
by the same subjects on the same pairs. Objective judgments on fullness 
and emptiness can be obtained only from two independent samples, one of 
which is asked 'fuller1 and the other its complement 'emptier'.
In view of the above differences it is perhaps not surprising that 
the present findings conflict rather sharply with Bruner and Kenney's 
results. The major reasons for the iliracipGqranGy/ appear to be the following. 
By presenting only a limited number of pairs, rather than all possible 
combinations of features, these investigators seem to have omitted some 
of the most crucial pairs: out of nineteen pairs which present difficulty
to the older 6ub|dcts in this study they had only four, and of the eight 
pairs where the number of subjects correct decreases with age they had only 
one.
Bruner and Kenney's observations on the difference between judgments 
of fuller and emptier - the latter being determined by volume empty rather 
than volume full - are also negated in this investigation; the original 
doubts regarding their procedure on this point thus seem to be justified. 
Also, support for the present findings mayobe found in the study on 
children's language comprehension cited earlier by Donaldson and Balfour 
(1968). These investigators showed that young children tend to regard 
"less" as undifferentiajted from "more", and that "more" was dominant as 
the interpretation given to the undifferentiated pair of words.
It is not possible to compare the two sets of results in detail, as 
Bruner and Kenney do not give the number or percentage of subjects correct 
(or incorrect) for each individual pair, but consider the percentage 
results only for their different types. As Table 19 shows, it is usually 
meaningless to consider averages in this context. Furthermore, they do 
not report whether any statistical tests were used to analyse their data.
The analysis of perceptual influences in the previous study is also 
inconsistent: in their experimental method Bruner and Kenney consider
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that height of glass, diameter of glass, water level and volume full are 
the operative perceptual factors but in discussing the results they observe 
that water level, volume of water and 'reaching to the top' are the 
predominant influences. They then proceed to analyse their findings in 
terms of the latter set of factors which they have just extracted from the 
results as being most influential, and not surprisingly the analysis 
supports their hypothesis.
Furthermore, Bruner and Kenney do not consider equal volume full and 
equal volume empty when the proportions full and empty are unequal, factors 
which proved very revealing in the present study. They also err in 
considering independent variability: they state that the height of the
glass, the water level, volume full and volume empty, "are independently 
variable of each other" as well as of proportion full and proportion empty. 
Independent variability of course applied only to the three perceptual 
indices, height of glass, diameter of glass and water level; the other 
features depend entirely, as Table 2 shows, on how these cues are combined.
Bruner and Kenney concede that their experiment "is not designed in 
such a way as to pick up the interaction among factors" so they "must 
leave the details unexplained". However, we have illuminated the details 
and their findings are clearly contradicted; the child, even at fifteen 
years of age, still thinks in terms of the volume contained rather than 
the proportion full. Indeed, the task is not easy even for adults who 
are still influenced by how the glasses look. There is clear evidence 
that the older child can cope with fractions and estimate the proportions 
or ratios existing between two volumes of liquid in containers, but even 
the adult finds it difficult to remain sufficiently detached from perceptual 
cues to also take into account the total volume of the containers.
Viewed against the literature cited earlier our results are as we 
might expect: in order to judge ratio through fullness the child must go
beyond the volume concept, and this, as Piaget et al have shown, is achieved
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only at the beginning of formal operations at about eleven years, Bruner's 
ceiling age level. Our failure to communicate to the older subjects exactly 
what the concept of fullness involves perhaps suggests that we are 
investigating a concept which is misused in everyday life by adults and 
children alike.
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CHAPTER IX 
RESULTS OF THE DEMONSTRATION STUDY
(a) Comparison between the results of the Grammar School and the 
Secondary School subjects 
The number of subjects correct for each pair in the two independent 
groups was calculated and is shown in Table 22. Since the demonstration 
study expects the subjects to benefit from a learning situation which 
requires, in addition to attention to the situation, a comprehension of 
the reasoning involved both with respect to the operative visual factors 
and the ratio-like computations carried out, as well as a willingness to 
accept the decisions made, it might be postulated that the grammar school 
pupils selected on the basis of higher I.Q.'s would perform better than 
the secondary school pupils. A number of one tail non-parametric tests 
was therefore carried out. The Fisher Exact Probability Test revealed 
that at the 0.05 level of rejection, fourteen of the total ninety-six cells 
were significant: three at the twelve year level, none for thirteen year
olds, three for the fourteen year olds, and eight at the fifteen year old 
level. These cells are marked in the table with an asterisk.
The Mann Witney U Test was also carried out on the total number of 
pairs correct for each subject. This test shows that with6* - .05 (1 tail) 
all the subjects except the twelve year group differed significantly.
Indeed it is interesting to note that as age increases so do the differences: 
the twelve year olds do not differ significantly at °< = .05, the thirteen 
year olds differ significantly at<* = .05, the fourteen year olds at<3(= .025 
and the fifteen year olds at - .001.
These results contrast sharply with the earlier finding that the two 
different school populations did not differ significantly in the first 
study and is further seen clearly in Table 22 and figure 9 for the average 
number of pairs correct for the two groups. It therefore appears that the 
grammar school children do improve and perform better following the
Figure 9
The average number of pairs correct for the minimum 24 pairs 
in both experiments for the Secondary Intermediate and 
the Grammar School pupils
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TABLE 22
NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES FOR THE DEMONSTRATION STUDY 
OF THE TWO GROUPS OF CHILDREN AT SECONDARY SCHOOL
Pair No.
Secondary Intermediate School Grammar School
12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15
1 10 10 10 9 9 10 10 9
2 2* 3 4 1* 8* 6 8 9*
3 2 6 6 3* 6 8 7 10*
4 10 7 8 10 8 8 10 10
5 6 4 6 6 7 5 10 9
6 1* 4 2* 3* 6* 6 7* 9*
7 8 7 10 10 9 9 7 10
8 10 10 10 9 9 8 10 10
9 2 3 3 2* 5 7 7 8*
10 9 10 10 9 9 8 10 10
11 7 9 10 8 9 9 9 10
12 3* 8 8 4* 9* 10 9 10*
13 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10
14 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10
15 8 4 2* 4* 5 7 8* 9*
16 7 8 7 8 8 8 7 10
17 8 5 4 6* 7 9 8 10*
18 5 3 2* 4 3 6 7* 6
19 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
21 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10
22 9 9 10 9 7 8 9 10
23 9 10 10 9 10 9 10 10
24 5 8 8 6* 9 9 9 10*
TABLE 23
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PAIRS CORRECT FOR THE 24 MINIMUM 
PAIRS FOR THE TWO GROUPS OF SECONDARY SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN
Type of School Secondary Intermediate Grammar
Age 12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15
Original study 14.5 15.1 16.4 16.8 16.1 15.7 15.8 15.1
Demonstration
study 17.1 17.8 18.0 17.0 19.3 19.9 21.0 22.9
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demonstration than the secondary intermediate pupils, that is, they seem 
more able to benefit from the learning situation.
As we are dealing with an overall representative sample the results 
of both groups of demonstration subjects in the twelve to fifteen year 
range were combined and treated as one sample for the rest of the analysis,
(b) Comparison between original subjects and demonstration subjects
Since it was hypothesized that the subjects who participated in the 
demonstration would be more efficient in judging which of a pair of glasses 
is fuller than those who did not, a 1 tailed Mann-Witney U Test was 
carried out on the total number of pairs judged correctly (Tables 13 and 24) 
for each subject. With p less than 0.05 all the age groups are significantly 
different. Indeed the seven, nine, ten and fourteen year olds are 
significantly different with p less than 0.05 and the six, eight, eleven, 
twelve, thirteen and fifteen year olds and the adult subjects with p less 
than 0.001.
This observation is corroborated by Table 25 and Figure 10 which show 
that the average number of pairs correct for each age level increases with 
age and is also higher in each case for the demonstration group even at 
the lower edge of the age range. The Secondary Intermediate School pupils 
alone in the four age groups from twelve to fifteen years also show higher 
averages than the original non-demonstration subjects.
Thus it may be concluded that when the subjects are shown what the 
judgment of fuller involves, they do perform better than when simply 
required to judge which of a pair of glasses if fuller, without having any 
indication of what exactly it is that they are being asked to do; it is 
just as much a question of learning what the task requires as learning how 
to perform it.
Closer scrutiny of the nature of the demonstration reveals that there 
are two major influences operating to bring about the improvement in 
performances: the effect of perceptual cues and the influence of E's verbal
instructions.
- 107-
TABLE 24
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH AGE GROUP IN 
THE DEMONSTRATION STUDY WHO JUDGED EACH PAIR CORRECTLY 
(TOTAL NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH AGE GROUP = 20)
Age of subjects
Pair No.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Adults
1 10 11 14 18 18 18 19 19 20 20 18 20
2 10 10 5 6 3 5 3 10 9 12 10 17
3 2 7 4 8 6 7 10 8 14 13 13 17
4 16 17 14 16 15 16 16 18 15 18 20 19
5 12 11 13 18 17 15 13 13 9 16 15 15
6 0 2 2 3 4 5 3 7 10 9 12 17
7 16 18 19 19 17 20 19 17 16 17 20 20
8 20 20 18 20 19 17 20 19 18 20 19 20
9 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 7 10 10 10 17
10 20 20 19 20 20 19 20 18 18 20 19 19
11 20 19 20 20 19 18 19 16 18 19 18 20
12 18 18 16 15 12 9 15 12 18 17 14 18
13 20 20 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 19 20 18
14 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 20 20
15 0 0 2 2 2 5 7 13 11 10 13 17
16 20 20 19 20 17 17 18 15 16 14 18 19
17 2 0 5 8 10 11 13 15 14 12 16 18
18 0 0 0 1 3 3 6 8 9 9 10 15
19 20 20 18 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19
21 20 20 18 20 20 20 20 20 19 20 20 19
22 19 20 20 20 19 19 18 16 17 19 19 19
23 20 20 20 20 17 19 20 19 19 20 19 20
24 20 20 20 19 18 16 15 14 17 17 16 19
TA
BL
E 
25
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Figure 10
The average number of pairs judged correctly for 
the minimum 24 pairs in both experiments
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(c) The Influence of Perceptual Cues on the Judgment of Fuller
Since the original experiment demonstrated clearly how susceptible 
the child is to perceptual cues in choosing which of a pair of glasses is 
fuller, the demonstration pairs were selected, as previously stated in the 
method, with respect to the arrangement of the three perceptual factors 
H.G., D.G. and W.L. in each pair, which together determine the volume full 
and volume empty and also the proportion full and proportion empty of each 
container. How effective therefore was the demonstration in overcoming 
this powerful influence?
The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (1 tail) between the subjects' 
judgments and how the pairs may be analyzed for the arrangement of perceptual 
cues was determined for each age level and is shown in Tables 26 and 27.
All the correlations in both studies are positive and those marked with an 
asterisk are significant at the 0.05 level of rejection. Indeed, for the 
nineteen pairs requiring comparative judgments all the correlations are 
significant at°< = .01 except for the five year old subjects in both studies 
and the seven year old demonstration subjects; the correlation for the 
adult subjects in the demonstration study is the only one for the nineteen 
comparative pairs not significant atc^= .05. Also of interest is the 
observation that in the five equality pairs the correlations for the 
demonstration group of subjects exceed those for the non-demonstration 
subjects except for the five and twelve year olds where the original 
correlations are greater than the demonstration ones, and the nine year olds 
where the correlations are equal. On the other hand, in the remaining 
nineteen pairs the demonstration correlations are all less than those obtained 
in the original study excluding the five and fifteen year olds where they 
are greater.
Several points are worthy of consideration in an analysis of these 
correlations. The three visual indices are operative in producing the 
volumes full in each pair and if a glass looks as if it contains more water
TABLE 26
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1 TAIL) BETWEEN PERCEPTUAL 
CUES AND THE JUDGMENT OF FULLNESS IN THE STUDY FOR THE 
24 PAIRS, (o< = .05) DEMONSTRATION
Ages 5 Equality Pairs 19 Remaining Pairs
5 0.9* 0.4842*
6 0.9* 0.6151*
7 0.9* 0.4407*
8 0.975* 0.5511*
9 0.675 0.7415*
10 0.7 0.7885*
11 0.7 0.6545*
12 0.3691 0.6437*
13 0.9* 0.5750*
14 0.975* 0.5381*
15 0.7379 0.7*
Adults 0.9* 0.3008
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TABLE 27
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1 TAIL TEST) BETWEEN 
PERCEPTUAL CUES AND SUBJECTS' JUDGMENTS FOR BOTH DEMONSTRATION (D) 
AND ORIGINAL (0) STUDIES («* = .05)
Age 5 Equality Pairs 19 Remaining Pairs
5 years D 0.9* 0.4842*
0 0.975* 0.3928*
6 D 0.9* 0.6151*
0 0.825 0.6755*
7 D 0.9* 0.4407*
0 0.6 0.7115*
8 D 0.975* 0.5511*
0 0.675 0.822*
9 D 0.675 0.7415*
0 0.675 0.874*
10 D 0.7 0.7885*
0 0.675 0.7975*
!
11 D 0.7 0.6545*
0 0.2 0.8275*
12 D 0.3691 0.6437*
0 0.7952 0.6636*
13 D 0.9* 0.5750*
0 0.2 0.6810*
14 D 0.975* 0.5381*
0 0.7952 0.6033*
15 D 0.7379 0.7000*
0 0.1539 0.5508*
Adults D 0.9* 0.3008
0 0.225 0.6955*
D: demonstration study
0: original study
Those pairs with an asterisk are significant at the 0.05 level of rejection.
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than it may be judged fuller. In the five equality pairs, three pairs 
(numbers 3, 9 and 18) have glasses with differing volumes full (V.F.) and 
two (numbers 1 and 15) have equal V.F. Therefore, because almost as many 
pairs have equal V.F. as different V.F., we should not expect a significantly 
high correlation between the judgment of equally full and the influence 
of perceptual, cues. On the other hand, however, twelve of the remaining 
nineteen pairs (numbers 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17 and 19 to 22) have 
the fuller glass containing the greater V.F.; four pairs (numbers 2, 12,
16, 23) have the fuller glass with equal V.F., and only three pairs 
(numbers 6, 11, 24) have the fuller glass containing less V.F. Therefore 
we should expect a very high correlation in these pairs. Indeed, even 
in the three pairs where the fuller glass contains less water the three 
perceptual cues are arranged in such a way as to facilitate judgment 
somewhat: in pair 6, while H.G. and D.G. militate against the correct
solution W.L. is equal; in pair 11 H.G. is equal and D.G. militates 
against a correct judgment, but W.L. favours the right solution; in pair 
24 W.L. also biases in favour of the correct response although H.G. and D.G. 
militate against. Thus pairs 11 and 24 especially might be said to be 
perceptually easy.
Of further note is the fact that of the six pairs chosen randomly within 
each 'perceptual group' (as explained in the Method) for the demonstration 
the one equal pair has two identical glasses containing equal amounts of 
water while of the remaining five pairs, four have the fuller glass with 
greater V.F. Indeed, the only pairs which evoked any spoken disagreement 
from the subjects during the demonstration were the fourth and fifth pairs: 
in pair 4 the glasses look as though they might contain equal volumes of 
liquid, and in pair 5, of course, W.L. is equal and the fuller glass has 
less V.F. Thus, in both the demonstration and the testing pairs the fuller 
glass in each pair in most instances does in fact contain more water, although 
no comparison is made across glasses during the demonstration; the judgment
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is made for each container individually and then it is paired with a second 
glass.
In conclusion, it may be stated that in a pair of glasses one of 
which is actually fuller than the other, the fuller glass does tend to 
contain a greater volume of liquid. This makes it difficult for the 
subject to learn that this is not always the case and that some bther rule 
governs the decision as to which is the fuller glass. Therefore, while 
all except one of the correlations are significant at the 0.05 level of 
rejection, and of these all excluding three at^= .01, it is worthwhile to 
repeat that, except for the five and fifteen year old subjects, those 
subjects who were given the demonstration appear to be influenced less by 
visual cues than those who did not participate in the demonstration.
(d) The Influence of the experimenter's verbal instructions on the 
subjects' reasoning
Close examination of the subjects' protocols reveals the influence 
the verbal instructions and language used during the demonstration exerted 
on the reasons given to substantiate the judgement of fuller.
The experimenter pinpoints two aspects invplved in computing the 
relevant ratios: (1) whether each glass contains more water than unfilled
space or vice versa, and (2) the extent to which each container has been 
filled. The latter is essentially only a concise mathematical way of 
formulating the former and answers the implicit question 'How full is 
each glass?' No comparison of the volumes of water contained was made across 
glasses and the only fraction mentioned is the 'easy' half.
As seen from Table 28, approximately one fifth of the non-demon&tration 
subjects named fractions: twenty-five of these restricted themselves to
the fraction "half" and the same number used other proportions. On the 
other hand, more than two.fffths of the demonstration subjects used fractions 
to explain their choice and of these, seventy-five mentioned only "half" 
and thirty-two named other ratios. In both instances the different
TABLE 28
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN BOTH STUDIES WHO MAKE USE OF 
FRACTIONS DURING THE VERBAL REASONING
Age in Years
The fraction h 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Adults Totals
original study 1 1 4 3 3 0 3 1 1 1 2 3 25
demonstration study 0 5 4 5 5 7 5 10 9 9 9 7 75
Other fractions
original study 0 0 2 0 1 2 5 2 1 2 2 8 25
demonstration study 0 0 1 2 2 3 6 0 4 5 3 6 32
TABLE 29
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN BOTH STUDIES WHO USE EITHER 
THE WORDS ’AIR' OR 'SPACE' DURING THEIR EXPLANATIONS
Age 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Adults Totals
original subjects 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 3 2 2 15
demonstration
subjects
0 2 4 6 6 9 7 16 17 12 12 13 104
TABLE 30
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN BOTH STUDIES WHO REFER TO POURING 
THE CONTENTS FROM ONE GLASS TO THE OTHER DURING THE 
JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR RESPONSES
Age 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Adults Totals
original subjects 1 0 2 5 6 3 5 7 3 1 1 2 36
demonstration
subjects
0 0 0 0 1 3 5 0 1 0 1 0 11
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proportions referred to were thirds, quarters, fifths, sixths, eighths, 
and tenths, with differentiation increasing with age. Of note is the fact 
that most subjects in both studies who refer to fractions other than half 
also use that ratio as well.
The number of subjects in the two studies who utilized either the 
words "space" or "air", was also calculated and is shown in Table 29. It 
is significant that one hundred and four of the two hundred and forty 
demonstration subjects (approximately 2/5ths) followed E's example to the 
extent of using similar words in comparison to the fifteen of the two 
huiidred and forty original subjects (1/I6th). While the demonstrator 
compared only the proportion of air or space to water in each individual 
glass, a large majority of the subjects compared these volumes across the 
two glasses of each pair. Also, many subjects who consider the air or space 
in the glasses also take into account the proportion filled.
Thus it is clear that when given examples of the verbal reasoning 
involved in the problem, more subjects follow suit than when left without 
aids. However, do the subjects use any other lines of reasoning not 
employed in the demonstration, and, if so, how do they compare with the 
non-demonstration group?
One type of reasoning encountered is a reference to how the glasses 
of a pair would compare if the contents of one were poured ei'ther into the 
other pair member when empty or into another glass identical with the 
second glass. Thirty-six original subjects consider this state of affairs 
while only eleven demonstration subjects think in this way (Table 30).
Here again the categories are not mutually exclusive and a child may vary 
his reasoning throughout the judging session.
Other modes of reasoning encountered less frequently were: a
comparison of the volumes of unfilled space in the two glasses of each pair; 
a comparison of the size of the glasses; a comparison of the water levels, 
including whether the contents of one glass were nearer the top of the glass
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than the other.
In spite of these different types of verbal reasoning presented by 
many subjects an attempt was made to decide on the principal strategy 
determining the performance of each individual subject. This was difficult 
in some instances as the governing principle varied throughout the task 
with some subjects, but the categories most prevalent (as shown in Table 31) 
were as follows: (I) a comparison of the proportion each glass in the
pair was filled; (II) whether one glass contained more water relative to 
space than the other; (III) whether one glass contained more water than 
the other; (IV) whether one glass contained more unfilled space than the 
other; (V) a comparison of the size of the two glasses; (VI) a comparison 
of the water levels; (VII) a comparison of the total capacities of the 
glasses involving the state of affairs if the contents of one glass were 
poured into the other; (VIII) whether the contents of one glass was 
'nearer the top' than the other; and finally (IX) those young subjects who 
were unable to substantiate their choices verbally. Only I and II occur 
in the demonstration.
It is clear from this table that the types of reasoning in order of 
frequency for both studies are III, I, II, V, VI, IV, IX, VIII, VII. For 
the original subjects in the non-demonstration study the order is III, VI,
V, I and VII, VIII and IX, then II and IV not occurring at all. For the 
demonstration.subjects, however, the order of frequency becomess III, I, II, 
IV, V, VI, IX, VIII with no instances of VII.
These results again reflect what has already been stated: even when
subjects participate in a demonstration where the strategy determing the 
judgment of fullness is explicitly verbalized, there remains the idea that 
the fuller container is the one containing more water. Also of significance 
in this table is the difference in I, II and also III ancl V in favour of 
the demonstration subjects and the difference in favour of the non- 
demonstration subjects in VI.
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In conclusion, it may therefore be stated that the verbalization by 
the experimenter in the second study influenced a considerable number of 
subjects in favour of utilizing the correct strategy, but the demonstration 
in toto was insufficiently effective to persuade about one third of the 
subjects not to choose the glass containing the greater volume of liquid.
TABLE 31
THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF VERBAL REASONING EMPLOYED 
BY THE ORIGINAL AND DEMONSTRATION SUBJECTS
Age 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Adults Totals
I Proportions 
filled 
compared
0
D 1 1 3 1
1
3
3
8 4 3 9 4
8
8 S -
II Water 
compared 
with space 
in each glas
0
D
5
1 1 2 2 3 1 5 7 5 7
1
10 4 ^ 45
III Volume of
water in the 
2 glasses 
compared
0
D
16
13
14
12
17
10
18
10
17
11
18
8
17
5
11
6
13
6
15
1
11
3
7
2
17 4 2fil
87
IV Volune of 
space in the 
2 glasses 
compared
0
D 1 2 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 *2 24
V Dimensions o 
the 2 glasse 
compared
:0
;D
1
1 4 3 5 4 1
4
1
5 1
1
6
1 n  38
VI Water levels 
compared
0
D 3
4
3
2 2
1
2 1 4
1
2 3 2
1
2
29 33
VII Capacities 
of the 
glasses 
(involving 
pouring)
0
D
1 1 2
i 4
VIII 'Nearer the 
top'
0
D
1
1 1 2
1 1 1
4 8
IX No reason 
given
0
D
3
4
1
1 1 6 10
TOTALS 0
D
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
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CHAPTER X
DISCUSSION OF THE DEMONSTRATION STUDY 
The principal intention of the second study was to determine how 
subjects would perform in the task of choosing which of two glasses was 
fuller, if the problem were communicated to them more precisely by means of 
a demonstration. The demonstration preceded the original task and involved 
both verbal and perceptual factors. It is interesting, therefore, to 
consider how the influence these factors exerted on the subjects' behaviour 
compares with the findings of the studies cited earlier.
It is noteworthy, in view of Piaget's contention that perceptions 
precede language developmentally, that some subjects in the original task 
responded correctly in terms of choosing the correct and fuller container, 
but when required to verbalize the reasons for their choice either had 
difficulty in doing so or gave the wrong reason. The very young subjects, 
true to their interpretation of the task, were capable of identifying the 
glasses containing the greater volume of water, but in many instances were 
unable to substantiate their response. As Mermelstein and Shulman (1967) 
ask, which do we accept as the true acquisition of the concept - the overt 
correct performance or the ability to manifest it in verbal communication? 
Also of note is their suggestion that it is conceivable that, due to the 
syncretic nature of egocentric thought, specific training in language does 
not ensure analytic understanding of the questions used prior to nine years 
of age. Our demonstration study indicates that in certain cases this age 
limit may be extended upwards.
The lack of understanding of the problem which was so evident in the 
first study suggested that the concept of fullness may be generally 
misunderstood in everyday life, and therefore prompted the second experiment. 
It was generally shown to be true and is, indeed, given support by other 
studies where similar questions involving commonly used words and concepts 
were also misunderstood. In one study on the development of size
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conservation (Braine and Shanks, 1965b), for example, the question "Which 
is bigger?" was found to be ambiguous; it was interpreted as "Which looks 
bigger?" or, "Which is really bigger?" The experimenters in this study 
therefore used these two questions and found that below seven years of age 
children tend to construe questions containing the word "bigger" as questions 
about phenomenal size unless feedback information forces a "reality" 
interpretation. Similarly Cohen (1967) eliminated words like "more",
"bigger" etc. from both instructions arid responses in her study on quantity
conservation because of their ambiguity.
Furthermore, it has also become clear that non-conserving children 
tend to make certain irrelevant interpretations of the words "same" and 
"more" when these are used in conservation of number problems. Braine and 
Shanks (1965a, b) have suggested that nonconserving children interpret "same" 
as meaning "look alike" rather than numerically equivalent. The former
interpretation of "same number" was also seen in this study in the extensive
use of the matching category when the nonconserving subjects were asked to 
make the two arrays have the same number of objects. Hood (1962) has 
suggested that the word "more" may mean to the nonconserving child only 
that the shape of the set is changed and that the space it occupies is 
greater than it was before. This finding is corroborated by the earlier 
study of Estes (1956), where the perceptual "more" and "numerical equal" 
were seen to co-exist without adequate differentiation in the cognition 
of children at a certain level, but where it was also seen that an 
experimenter can bring either one to the foreground by appropriate 
questioning.
These interpretations of the words "same" and "more" appear in solving 
conservation problems even after appropriate understanding of these words 
in other, nonconservation situations has been demonstrated. Indeed, 
Rothenberg (1969) goes as far as to suggest that stage 1, defined by 
Piaget (1952) as the absence of conservation, might be more meaningfully 
divided into substages. These substages would be: .(a) lack of understanding
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of the conservation questions, as seen among inconsistent nonconservers, 
and (b) understanding of the language of the questions with, however, no 
conservation of any transformations, as seen among -tefce- consistent 
nonconservers.
The verbalization by the experimenter during the demonstration was 
intended to direct the subjects1 attention away from irrelevant factors 
towards the significant dimensions. Other research (Hall and Kingsley,
1968) has also shown that children in the intuitive thought stage do not 
necessarily rely on visual cues but are quite dependent on the experimenter's 
suggestion which is seen to systematically bias the results. On the other 
hand, while Wolff (1967) claims that verbalization by the subject has a 
positive effect, it is perhaps more relevant to repeat Phelan's (1965) 
suggestion that concepts are formed without verbalization and that 
unsuccessful attempts to put concepts into words can destroy or distort 
the concepts themselves. Support for his position may be claimed from 
the present study when he reports that spurious rules can be developed 
from inadequate verbalization and these can be substituted for the incorrect 
but efficiently functioning concept and so lead to maladaptive problem 
solving behaviour: the concept of fullness as a ratio would seem to be
generally misunderstood and verbalization by the subject wJe*4ecl this 
misinterpretation during the experiment.
Although it has been shown that conservation is positively correlated 
with intelligence quotient, mental age and verbal ability (Goldschmid, 1967) 
the subjects of secondary school age in this study on the fullness concept 
did not differ significantly in their performance in the original task and 
the grammar school pupils showed a marked superiority only in the demonstration 
study. Of relevance here also, is the investigation by Osier and Weiss 
(1962) where it was seen that more intelligent children were superior in 
the problem finding phase but not in problem solving.
Providing the subjects with the principle involved is important
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(Klausmeier and Meinke 1968) but may be inferior to perceptual confirmation 
training (Beilin et al 1966). The demonstration incorporated instructions 
about the principle and also to a limited extent involved perceptual 
confirmation, but, as already indicated, it may not have provided 
sufficient examples of the few cases where the fuller glass does not 
contain the greater volume of water. It also gave the subjects an opportunity 
to select the relevant factors from the irrelevant ones although as seen 
earlier some subjects err in deciding which are the correct factors and 
make what Donaldson (1963) calls a structural error.
Also of note is the memory load involved (Denny and Gamblin 1965).
The information required to perform correctly was provided prior to usage 
and once given was not repeated during the actual testing. Indeed, the 
subjects were given no real opportunity, once the demonstration was given, 
of testing their hypotheses. Unlike the study by Wallach, Wall and 
Anderson (1967) where children were induced into conservation by a 
reversibility procedure, the subjects in the present study were not forced 
to stop using misleading perceptual cues, either by the method used or by 
feedback. Also, no use could be made by the subject of the negative 
instances except where corrected in his use of phrases such as the "bigger 
glass" or "the glass with more water" etc. when giving his choice and was 
instead asked if one glass were fuller than the other, thus implying that 
a difference existed.
It may be felt that lack of active participation during the demonstration 
may also have been detrimental to the maximum improvement possible, but a 
very recent experiment on training in the conservation 6f weight, suggests 
that this would not have made a difference (Overbeck and Schwartz, 1970).
Cohen (1967) does, however, consider the participation factor to play an 
important role in her study on the conservation of quantity.
In view of Bruner and Kenney's findings, it is somewhat surprising 
to find that some adults, even after the demonstration, are not fully
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convinced of the principle involved. However the work by Lovell (1968) 
on the schema of proportion and at least two experiments on conservation of 
volume, a less difficult concept, support the present results. In his 
twenty tasks covering both the schema of proportion and of ratio Lovell (1968) 
has corroborated earlier studies which demonstrate that the move towards 
understanding proportionality is slow well into high school. Even at 
fifteen years of age the number of responses at or near the stage of formal 
thought in six of his tasks (the calculation of missing numbers in a series, 
the rings and shadow experiment, the balance experiment, the relation between 
the size of the external angle of a regular polygon and the number of sides 
of the polygon, the ratio of the areas of similar triangles given the 
dimensions of one pair of corresponding sides, and verbal analogies), is 
still a little under 50 per cent.
In one study (Elkind 1961a, 1962) on the conservation of volume only 
47 per cent of the junior and high school students tested had an abstract 
conception of volume, and the percentage of students having a true concept 
increased significantly between the ages of twelve and eighteen. The 75 per 
cent level for conservation of volume occurred about age fifteen. Furthermore, 
Hall and Kingsley (1968) found that, not only do adults fail to conserve 
quickly in many cases, but the majority also extinguish when faced with 
empirical evidence contrary to their expectations.
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION
An investigation was made of the manner in which the concept of 
proportion, as embedded in the idea of fullness, grows in the child's 
thinking. What emerges is the importance of the subject's method of dealing 
with the perceptual features of the task and the finding that the notion of 
fullness as a ratio is generally misunderstood even by adults.
The child begins with a discrete, almost binary, rendering of the 
concept of fullness in terms of the two extreme states, empty and full.
Early in his development he accomplishes this by use of highly enactive 
definitions - 'full' is 'when it is about to spill' and 'empty' is, perhaps, 
'turn-over-able after drinking'. Gradually there is movement to perceptual 
definition of the two terms - 'full' means 'much water', 'empty' means 
'little water' - and soon there is a separation of the attributes used for 
dealing with this contrast pair. At this stage the comparative terms are 
reasoned similarly - 'fuller' means 'greater volume of liquid' and 'emptier' 
means 'lesser volume of liquid'.
Progression to the next stage does not involve simply attending to more 
cues but rather using a new computing of relationships and the child rnust 
euewbuzdlij to form a ratio idea into which previously dominating
perceptual cues can be fitted and put to a new use. Without an explanation 
of the exact relationships involved, however, both the child and adult do 
not realize that the task requires the volume of liquid contained to be 
related to the total volume of the container.
Piagetian theory holds that the child is ready for attaining the 
abstract concept of volume about age eleven or twelve. Readiness, either 
maturational or experiential, assumes that the child is beginning to attain 
the concept but, as supported by the conservation of volume studies already 
cited (especially those by Elkind (1962) and Rothenberg (1969)), it does 
not imply that he has already achieved it. At the same age the child is
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developing formal mental operations which are concered with constructing 
systems and theories. It is not until this ability develops that he can 
cope with the multiplicative compensations and proportions involved in the 
task of conserving volume.
In view of this background it is therefore not surprising to find that 
the child up to fifteen years of age and also the adult do not fully 
understand the ratios involved in the task of judging the fuller of two 
containers. In order to judge correctly, by reasoning correctly, which of 
two glasses is fuller one requires much more than an understanding of the 
proportions which occur, for example, when liquid is poured from one 
container to another. By eleven years of age the child can cope with 
fractions and can estimate the proportions or ratios existing between two 
volumes of liquid in containers but the fifteen year old and even the adult 
are still not aware of the full implications of the task.
When the problem is communicated more precisely by means of a 
demonstration, involving perceptual and linguistic aids, the child shows a 
marked improvement at all age levels from five to fifteen years, and the 
adult also reveals superior performance. Performance of the task following 
the demonstration is, however, still not perfect even for the adult. A 
person may persist in the belief that he need only compare the volumes of 
liquid contained and therefore prove resistant to the suggestion that in 
judging fullness he must also take into account the total volume of the 
containers; that is, he must not only estimate the volume of the glass 
that is filled but also relate this volume to the total volume of the 
container and finally compare the two ratio measures obtained.
The concept of fullness as a ratio, when measured in an exact and 
comprehensive manner, is seen to be generally confused and it is just as 
much a question of learning what the task requires as learning how to 
perform it.
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